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1. Preface and acknowledgment 
Justice is a central issue in people’s lives. In many settings, 
such as our families, our workplace, or our civic systems, justice is a 
main concern for us. The broad interest of humans in justice is also a 
reason, why many different branches of the arts and sciences deal 
with justice related topics. For example, philosophers give us a hint 
what is just and what is not. Psychologists investigate how people 
perceive and think about justice. When we observe societies at large, 
sociologists also share a substantial interest in the area. Even 
branches of research with traditionally a rare interest in the topic, 
such as business administration, increasingly care about justice and 
its effects. 
What is puzzling me when I look at justice and fairness is that 
fairness seems to be paradoxically stable in many domains, but 
rather fragile in other. For example, managers commit tax fraud while 
donating significant amounts of money to charity. Further, people 
have surprisingly little problems stealing a pen from the office but 
would never dare to take an equivalent amount of money from a cash 
register. Finally, people download music and movies off the Internet 
yet without acknowledging the act as stealing. Analyzing effects of the 
stability and fragility of fairness is thus an important attempt to 
understand human behavior. 
In this dissertation, which is psychological in its nature, a view 
of several facets of justice is taken. Owed to the fruitfulness of 
interdisciplinary conduct, I apply different methods from different 
specialization in psychology in order to gain a better understanding of 
the complex topic of justice. The methods include experimental 
games commonly used in experimental and behavioral economics as 
well as social psychology. Further, some experiments are embedded 
into a consumer psychological context. Some qualitative measures 
are used to gain insight into emotions underlying justice concerns. 
Finally and most importantly, individual differences in justice 
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perception and behavior are investigated using people’s differences in 
their justice sensitivity (more on that follows later). 
The modern demands of scientific training are not only the 
writing of a doctoral dissertation but also an early presence in the 
“scientific community”. Researchers are as early as in their doctoral 
training confronted with the international competition about 
publications in internationally renowned journals. Since space in 
such journals is immensely scarce and it usually takes several 
attempts to successfully publish in such, “wasting” expensive 
datasets solely for the sake of a dissertation is, unfortunately, not an 
option. In this respect, this dissertation is no exclusion. Hence, many 
of the topics discussed in this dissertation are based on research, 
which has been submitted for publication to peer-reviewed journals. 
Whenever papers based on research presented here are currently 
being reviewed a footnote will tell that. 
Also, science is rarely done alone. One mind is seldom 
sufficient to address today problems – be they scientific or from the 
real world. Thus, I have relied on the help of many. Even though their 
help was significant at all points of research and writing, all mistakes 
remain entirely my own. My deepest appreciation goes to many: 
Above all, I thank Professor Doctor Detlef Fetchenhauer for his 
continuous efforts in supervising and funding this thesis and my 
research, for raising my interest in psychology, and for his 
uncountable attempts to turn me into a psychologist by heart – he 
may finally have succeeded. I thank Doctor Thomas Schlösser for his 
mentorship both professionally and personally. Without our 
intellectual debates and especially his outstanding intellectual 
precision and skepticism, this dissertation would not have been 
anywhere near its current state. I thank Professor Doctor Dave 
Dunning of Cornell University for co-supervising this thesis. 
Especially the participation in one of his seminars (i.e. Self and Self-
Insight) taught me important lessons about me and also deepened my 
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interest in psychological research. I deeply thank my mentor Doctor 
Tyler Okimoto and his wife Mel for offering me the unique 
opportunity to live and study at Yale University and giving me a 
whole new view on justice. I have not only found a co-researcher and 
mentor in him but also a friend. Thanks to Professor Doctor Daylian 
Cain of Yale University for giving me yet another view on the issue 
and helping me to become a better negotiator. 
My appreciation goes to my current and former colleagues at 
the department who simply have been there in time of need – 
everyone in his or her own unique way: Doctor Fabian Christandl, 
Doctor Franz Gresser, Doctor Mareike Hoffmann, Ole Mensching, 
Doctor Julia Pradel, Julia Sauerbrey, Christoph Sieper, and 
Stephanie Stukenberg. My special thanks go to Ingrid Kampkötter for 
her best effort to help with all administrative tasks. 
This dissertation would never have been finished without the 
support of my colleagues joining the work on the German Research 
Foundation (DFG) project Sandra Kieser and Katharina Schneider. I 
am deeply grateful for their never-ending enthusiasm and willingness 
to excel for this research. I thank my collaborators from Landau, 
Doctor Anna Baumert, Professor Doctor Mario Gollwitzer, Doctor 
Tobias Rothmund, Professor Doctor Manfred Schmitt, and Nadine 
Thomas, for the joint work on justice sensitivity and their valuable 
input for this research. 
As you will later see virtually hundreds of participants 
volunteered to participate in my studies. Under no circumstances 
would it have been possible to recruit all of them by myself. Thus, I 
thank all participants of my seminars and diploma thesis-students 
for their extraordinary efforts in the data collection. Of course, thanks 
to all voluntary study participants. 
My deepest thanks, however, go to my family, my father 
Wolfgang, my mother Iris, and my brother Tobias who supported my 
thesis in a best imaginable way. Finally, my deep thanks go to 
  
IX 
Veronique Berger. Without her this project would have ended years 
ago. Only her passionate commitment to my success and her 
emotional support made it possible for me to get back on track when 
lost. 
 
In the summer of 2010 
 
Sebastian Lotz 
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2. Introduction 
 
A society regulated by a public sense of justice is inherently stable. 
JOHN RAWLS – A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
Justice concerns are prevalent in much of our every day 
concerns. In all kinds of surroundings, justice is a major guiding 
principle of human action. When we raise our kids we make sure to 
apply the same rules to each child. When we think about sharing 
something we aim at a fair way that makes everyone happy. Even in 
business life, increasing efforts are made to move away from mere 
selfish concerns to more fairness. Examples of the latter include fair 
wages, fair trade, or fair procedures in recruitment. 
Matters of human concern about justice are also in the interest 
of scientists. The earliest scientific work in the area of justice has 
been addressed back in antique times. In his major work called 
Nicomachian Ethics, Aristotle addressed the topic and remained 
influential up to today. His works – as the works of other 
philosophers – are normative in their nature meaning that they reflect 
human behavior, perception and judgment. This is one important 
aspect to an understanding of justice. Yet the derivation of objective 
standards of justice is still continuing as modern philosophers add to 
our understanding of the topic (e.g. Rawls, 1971). Essential to 
philosophical theorizing is that philosophers derive what is just or 
fair. 
Another important branch of justice research is how people 
perceive, judge and behave in justice-related issues. This is the key 
enquiry of psychological science, which is descriptive in nature. 
Hence, it is not spent much thought about whether something is or is 
not fair objectively, but rather how people think and feel about the 
issue (the next sub-chapter includes a more detailed analysis of the 
psychology of justice). 
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Outside the realms of objectivity, however, subjective thoughts, 
feelings, and reactions towards injustices or other justice-related 
issues might differ substantially among individuals. Illustrating 
individual differences is best shown by an example introducing two 
characters well known to many readers – one is fictional and one is 
authentic. Edmond Dantés is the main character of Alexandre 
Dumas’ famous work The Count of Monte Cristo. Despite his 
innocence, Dantés is charged with treason and wrongly imprisoned 
on Chateau d’If, an island off the coast of Marseilles, France on the 
eve of his wedding-day. After serving 14 years in prison he escapes. 
Ultimately, outraged and motivated by desires of justice and – more 
specifically- revenge, he starts a crusade against the people 
responsible and behind his imprisonment. In the eyes of Dantés, 
revenge and justice seeking are equivalent and thus, he believes to do 
what needs to be done to re-establish justice. Somehow similarly and 
yet quite contrarily, Nelson Mandela, South-Africa’s pioneer in the 
Anti-Apartheid movement, also served more than two decades in 
prison, much of it on Robben Island off the coast of Cape Town, 
South Africa. In contrast to Dumas’ character Edmond Dantés, 
Mandela retained from revenge after his release and built a new 
nation based on his chosen justice-response – forgiving. Revenge and 
forgiving are thus very distinct reactions to a very similar 
transgression and yet this similar transgression might lead to very 
different behaviors and outcomes affecting as much as the creation of 
an entire nation. While, certainly, many outside influences impacted 
the distinct behaviors of the two, even the most skeptical reader has 
to agree that at least some of the difference might lie in the different 
personalities of Edmont Dantés and Nelson Mandela. 
And in a nutshell, this is what this dissertation addresses. How 
do individual differences in justice-related personality traits affect 
subsequent perception, emotional experience, and behavior? More 
specifically, the main empirical enquiry is in people’s decision making 
as well as the underlying psychological processes around such 
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issues. While at first, the focus is on people’s decision to be fair or 
selfish (second-party justice) the focus later switches to situations 
where people are confronted with unfairness and have to decide if 
they are willing to engage to resolve the unfairness and thus re-
establish justice at own expenses (third-party justice). While this 
dissertation only includes laboratory experiments and studies, the 
experimental situations typically reflect real-life situations in different 
contexts such as charitable giving or social courage. Finally, the topic 
of justice is applied to a consumer-research setting and it is shown, 
how in an applied setting of justice so called Fair Trade products 
affect people’s judgment about the product, teaching a lesson how 
justice concerns subtly influence people in general. 
2.1. The psychology of justice 
Psychology is interested in the naïve human understanding of 
justice (Schmitt, Baumert, Fetchenhauer, Gollwitzer, Rothmund, & 
Schlösser, 2009). This interest is transported in research addressing 
identification of conditions, which people regard as just as well as 
cognitive and emotional reactions to suffered or observed injustice 
(Montada, 1994, Carlsmith & Darley, 2008). Further, the question of 
how people restore justice (see for example, Okimoto, Feather, & 
Wenzel, 2009; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008) as well as how people cope 
with un-changeable injustices is of major importance in psychological 
research (Lerner, 1977). Reviewing decades of psychological research 
in justice leads to the notification of four influential psychological 
theories of justice, which serve as a wide basis for much 
psychological research in social justice (Schmitt et al., 2009). 
First, the theory of relative deprivation (Stouffer, Suchman, 
DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949) argues that people regard an issue 
as fair if it is in line with expectations based on their claims. Relative 
deprivation theory is particularly influential in social issues such as 
development aid. It is the theoretical underpinning of concepts such 
as relative vs. absolute poverty – both measures of political decision-
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making. Second, equity theory (Adams, 1965) describes fairness as 
the congruence of inputs and outputs among individuals. 
Accordingly, people judge a distribution as fair if the shares reflect 
the effort each recipient invested in the object of distribution. The 
concept is commonly applied in socio-economic backgrounds such as 
the determination of wages, societal burdens or benefits. Third, the 
“just world” research (Lerner, 1977) dealt with situations, which are 
simply not changeable, thus primarily addressing how individuals 
cope with such non-ideal situations of – potentially extreme – 
injustice. Fourth, procedural justice theory (Thibaut & Walker, 1975) 
showed how not only outcomes but also how they are reached is of 
major importance. As long as procedures are fair it is much easier to 
cope with resulting unjust outcomes. Drawing from these four 
theories, the psychology of justice has delivered influential insights in 
virtual all kinds of life (Schmitt et al., 2009). 
What the majority of works in the area of social justice shares 
is the nature of a general psychological approach. Rather than 
accounting for individual differences these works aimed to answer the 
important question, what people in general feel, think, and do about 
justice or injustice. Not accounting for individual differences, 
however, has raised a substantial amount of critique (e.g. Major & 
Deaux, 1982, Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006). As virtually all 
of human behavior is, at least partly, determined by personality, 
there is no argument that the area of justice should be an exclusion. 
The earlier example of how differently Edmond Dantés and Nelson 
Mandela coped with similar situations reflects that. In research, the 
belief in a just world (Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987), 
preferences for distributional principles (Davey, Bobocel, Hing, & 
Zanna, 1999; Sabbagh, Dar, & Resh, 1994), as well as opinion about 
procedural justice (Schmitt & Dörffel, 1999) are only a few examples 
of how individual differences in justice can be incorporated (Schmitt 
et al., 2009). The focus of the present research, however, is on justice 
sensitivity (Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010; Schmitt, 
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Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005; Schmitt, Neumann, & Montada, 
1995). 
2.2. Individual differences in justice sensitivity 
Justice sensitivity measures stable and consistent individual 
differences in the tendency to perceive injustices as well as in the 
tendency to respond to such (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987; 
Lovas & Wolt, 2002). It consists of different indicators and is 
distinctive depending on the kind of involvement in an episode of 
injustice. 
2.2.1. Indicators of Justice Sensitivity 
Schmitt et al. (1995) suggest four indicators to measure 
individuals’ justice sensitivity (see also, Schmitt et al., 2009). First, it 
is indicated by the frequency of experienced injustices. Justice 
sensitivity, as all concepts of sensitivity, depends on a threshold. The 
more sensitive a person is towards injustices the more injustices this 
person should perceive, recall, and report. For example, stealing a 
pen (worth 1 Euro) from the office versus stealing a 1-Euro coin from 
the cash register might be evaluated quite differently depending on 
one’s justice sensitivity. While stealing money is probably regarded a 
transgression by a vast majority of people, taking a pen might only be 
regarded wrong by people particularly with a lower justice-threshold. 
Second, the intensity of affective valence to injustices has 
motivational foundations. The efficacy with respect to behavior 
results from anticipated and accompanying (moral) emotions. These 
can be either of positive or negative valences. In case of a suffered 
injustice the predominant emotion is anger (Mikula, Scherer, & 
Aethenstaedt, 1998, Törestad, 1990). 
The mental intrusiveness of injustices is the third indicator. 
Rumination is the one of the most common side effects of emotional 
harmful experiences. Thoughts about these events typically 
automatically pop into people’s minds. The strength and length of 
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this phenomenon depend on the subjective eminence of the event 
(Rime, Philippot, Boca, & Mesquita, 1992). 
 Last, behavioral reactions towards the perpetrator or the 
victim result from the psychological and social function of feelings 
towards injustices. Possible means of justice seeking can be 
punishment of the perpetrator, compensation of the victim, or 
retribution (see for example, Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, in 
press). 
2.2.2. Perspectives of Justice Sensitivity  
The fact that injustices can also be experienced from different 
perspectives is accounted for in the construct of justice sensitivity. 
Accordingly, justice sensitivity is measured from four different 
perspectives, capturing all possible ways of involvement in injustices: 
victim (JSvictim), perpetrator (JSperpetrator), beneficiary (JSbeneficiary), and 
observer (JSobserver).1 As such, the construct is not designed to 
measure general justice sensitivity, but rather justice sensitivity from 
the different perspectives with each facet consisting of a 10-item self-
report scale. These four sub-dimensions of justice sensitivity, 
however, share some common variance commonly interpreted as 
reflecting general justice concerns (Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, 
Maes, & Baer, 2005). Further, JSperpetrator, JSbeneficiary, and JSobserver 
involve genuinely other-regarding justice concerns and have been 
found to correlate with prosocial personality traits such as empathy, 
social responsibility, and role taking. JSvictim, by contrast, seems to be 
a combination of justice-oriented as well as self-oriented concerns 
(Gollwitzer et al., 2005; Schmitt et al., 2005). It was found to correlate 
positively with rather anti-social measures such as Machiavellianism, 
jealousy, and vengeance (Schmitt et al., 2005). 
                                                        
1 Until recently, justice sensitivity only captured three perspectives. The 
differentiation of beneficiary and perpetrator was establish to account for passive 
benefits versus active action (Schmitt et al., 2010). Beware of this when consulting 
other research (especially Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004 and Gollwitzer et al., 
2005)! 
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The four dimensions of justice sensitivity are distinct in the 
specific emotional and behavioral reaction towards injustices. While 
perpetrators and beneficiaries predominantly react with guilt, they 
are either willing to sacrifice own resources to restore justice or they 
punish themselves for the committed injustice. Observers 
predominantly respond with indignation and either compensate the 
victim or punish the perpetrator. Victims, finally, mainly experience 
anger and thrive for retaliation against the offender (Schmitt et al., 
2009). 
2.2.3. Justice Sensitivity in the context of experimental games 
In order to judge the quality of a personality measure it has to 
show its predictive power in behavioral decision-tasks (Schmitt et al., 
2009). Especially in the context of experimental games (e.g. Güth, 
Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) this can be shown in highly 
controlled environments. The experiments conducted for this 
dissertation therefore augment prior findings. For example, 
Fetchenhauer & Huang (2004) provided first evidence that justice 
sensitivity predicts behavior in standard behavioral economic 
paradigms. In their study, prosocial justice sensitivity – justice 
sensitivity from the perspectives of perpetrators, beneficiaries and 
observers – was significantly associated to prosocial behavior in the 
dictator game, the ultimatum game, and a third-party punishment 
game. Victim-sensitivity, contrarily was not associated to prosocial 
behavior and sometimes even to antisocial behavior. Schlösser and 
Fetchenhauer (in preparation, cited in Schmitt et al., 2009) show, 
additionally, that justice sensitivity outperforms agreeableness of the 
five-factor-model (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993), social responsibility 
(Bierhoff, 2000), as well as moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) in 
experimental games. Thus, it seems reasonable to rely on justice 
sensitivity to study individual differences in experimental games 
reflecting important social issues. 
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2.2.4. Prosocial justice sensitivity as predictor of fair behavior 
and willingness to confront unfairness 
Drawing from the existing evidence of justice sensitivity as 
(better) predictor of prosocial behavior in experimental games, this 
dissertation addresses not only the predictive power but also its 
situational stability across experimental games reflecting social 
situations. The general hypothesis offered is that prosocial facets of 
justice sensitivity are related to prosocial behavior (i.e. in allocation 
decisions, third-party punishment, third-party compensation). 
Further, people high in prosocial justice sensitivity are rather 
immune to situational variation in their fairness concerns and 
actions. Further, reactions towards witnessed injustices are mediated 
by the emotional experience (e.g. moral outrage such as anger). 
2.2.5. Victim-sensitivity as sensitivity towards other’s mean 
intentions 
This dissertation is foremost interested in shedding light on 
questions of prosocial behavior. Thus, prosocial justice sensitivity is 
of major importance. Victim-sensitivity, contrarily, is a satellite to 
this research, which however, has to be kept in mind when thinking 
about non-social behavior or even antisocial behavior. Thus, it is also 
important to understand the “other side” of injustices. Generally, it 
can be assumed that victims react heavily to (1) uncontrollable 
injustice and/or (2) mean intentions by others (Schmitt et al., 2009). 
If the former were true, people high in JSvictim could use highly 
controllable situations (such as experimental games) in order to 
restore their “equity with the world” (Austin & Walster, 1975). If the 
latter were true, cognitions of suspicion in the sense of assumed 
mean intentions and the fear of exploitation could be the basis of 
anti-social action (Schmitt et al., 2009). Some evidence suggests that 
victim-sensitivity is indeed sensitivity to mean-intentions (Gollwitzer, 
2005; Gollwitzer & Rothmund, 2010). However, the core empirical 
enquiry in the present context does not put subjects in the role of the 
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victim and thus, this detailed view on victim-sensitivity is ill-suited. 
Regarding prosocial behavior, victim-sensitivity is always expected to 
be non-related (i.e. technically uncorrelated) to behavior as well as 
emotional mediators, due to conflicting influences of genuine justice 
concerns and self-oriented concerns. 
3. Overview of current research 
Life includes a substantial amount of occasions where it is 
possible for us to behave in a way that serves our self-interest but not 
other’s interests. Social scientists have been successful in showing 
conditions under which subjects behave prosocially or selfishly (e.g. 
Batson, 1994). Further, a substantial amount of research is devoted 
to discover how personality traits affect such prosocial behavior. 
Chapter 4 addresses person-situation interactions in order to 
examine prosocial behavior in economic games more holistically. 
By employing three different versions of the standard dictator 
game it is shown that person-situation interactions can add to our 
understanding of prosocial behavior. The dictator game is a tool 
introduced by economists to study the degree of one’s prosocial 
behavior. In a dictator game, a person (the dictator) is endowed with 
an amount of money. This amount can vary as desired by the 
researcher and the dictator’s task is to anonymously divide the pot 
between him- or herself and another person (usually called the 
receiver). In the present context, I systematically varied the dictator 
game to address questions of potential behavioral confounds 
regarding the property rights of the initial endowment as well as the 
receiver’s felt victimization and thus, his/her expectation. Besides the 
standard paradigm, I used two variations. 
The first variation reversed the property rights (see also Oxoby 
& Spraggon, 2008) of the initial endowment – giving it to the receiver 
and enabling the dictator to take some or all money away. The second 
variation is designed to eliminate receiver’s expectations (Dana, Cain, 
& Dawes, 2006). In it, I told dictators that their decision was highly 
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private because receivers expected to be in a lottery about the money 
with no information about chances. Leaving a dictator game without 
receiving anything is ostensibly less troubling if receivers do not 
know that they are a part of the game. 
In total, I used these games to represent a function of games 
where it is sometimes easier to exploit (lottery game) and sometimes 
harder to exploit (reversed property rights game) the situation for 
selfishness’ sake. With respect to purely outcome-based theory of 
social preferences (e.g. Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000, or Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999) these games are totally equivalent as these preferences are 
presumably purely shaped by the size of the pie and nothing else. 
The results show that for people genuinely interested in 
fairness, prosocial behavior remains stable across situations. For 
people not as genuinely interested in fairness, situations serve as a 
means to pursue self-interest showing how fragile fairness concerns 
sometimes are. The personality trait justice sensitivity (Schmitt et al., 
1995, 2005, 2009, 2010) is employed to categorize peoples genuine 
concerns for justice. 
The findings contribute to important issues in economic 
theorizing employing well-established insights from psychological 
research. A major concern is the current debates in economic 
theories about social utility. On the one hand, models of social 
preferences suggest stable preferences over outcomes in wide 
varieties of games. Contrarily, research shows that humans heavily 
use situational power to exploit some games for the sake of self-
interest and are thus sensitive towards social psychological cues. By 
accounting for my suggested importance of person-situation 
interactions, I combine these two opposing streams of research and 
show how this puzzle can be jointly understood. Besides 
contributions to economic theorizing the insights can be applied to 
broader social contexts including not only allocation decisions but 
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also third-party interventions, coordination in social dilemmas as well 
as fraudulent behavior. 
Chapter 5 augments the thoughts of Chapter 4 by directly 
addressing such third-party interventions. The key question is: Why 
do some people engage in costly bystander intervention against norm 
violations without any personal direct or indirect gains? The chapter 
investigates justice sensitivity and moral emotions as determinants of 
such altruistic punishment. I propose that the individual strength of 
other-directed justice concerns explains the willingness to 
altruistically punish wrongdoers. Moreover, I show that moral 
emotions provide the driving motivation and mediate the effect of 
justice sensitivity on altruistic punishment. Results of an 
experimental study show such a mediation effect for justice 
sensitivity from the beneficiary perspective, but not for observer and 
victim sensitivity. Further, the study investigates reasons for 
defaulted punishment. The results suggest that selfishness is not the 
only reason for not punishing. While people high in beneficiary- and 
observer-sensitivity rather argue based on moral reasons or admit to 
feel guilty for not engaging in altruistic punishment, people high in 
victim-sensitivity provide reasons mainly based on selfish concerns. 
Taken together, the study provides important insights in the 
motivations involved in altruistic punishment.  
Chapter 6 continues the ideas given in Chapter 5. The almost 
exclusive focus on punishment and negligence of compensatory 
alternatives in studies involving experimental games may yield 
patterns that do not accurately reflect how and when people respond 
to injustice, particularly if punishment and compensation are not 
psychologically equivalent approaches to justice restoration. People’s 
arguments in the previous chapter point this out. In Chapter 6, I 
examined participants’ justice sensitivity as it predicted both their 
punitive and compensatory behaviors, while also exploring 
underlying emotional determinants and boundary conditions. Results 
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show that third-party desires to compensate victims of injustice were 
associated with inward-focused emotions such as anxiety and fear 
and were partly dependent on the victim’s awareness of his/her 
victimization (varying the victim’s felt consequences). In contrast, 
punishment of the offender was associated with outward-focused 
emotions such as moral outrage, and was stable regardless of 
transgression visibility. These findings are consistent with the 
understanding of punishment as a relatively deontological approach 
and compensation as a relatively more consequential approach to 
justice. Implications of these findings for understanding the broader 
range of justice responses and motives are also discussed. 
Finally, empirical research in the context of the ethical label 
Fair Trade is addressed (Chapter 7). Rather than showing individual 
differences in justice contexts, it is explored what justice does in a 
situation reflecting real life. Psychological research has shown that 
much of perception is functioning as a top-down process. Prior 
experience or motivations thus shape perception in addition to 
bottom-up processes stemming from the perceived object itself. The 
chapter investigates in how far the concerns for justice can serve as 
this motive shaping perceptual preference and how consumer 
judgment might be influenced by a what-is-fair-is-good heuristics. In 
the case of ethical labeling (Fair Trade) high standards of justice in 
the supply chain are guaranteed. Two experiments involving the 
ratings of chocolate and coffee show consistently, how the mere 
exposure to the ethical label leads people to rate taste higher 
compared to situation where no label is shown. 
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4. What you don’t know may hurt me – The 
effects of variations in justice sensitivity on 
allocation decisions2 
4.1. Introduction 
Prosocial behavior towards non-related persons is a research 
topic across many disciplines of science. Recently it has been shown 
how small situational variations can turn altruism on and off, for 
example, causing people to anonymously give but then immediately 
renege on their gift once the situational variable changes. The 
concern of this paper is whether or not these effects are due to a 
general phenomenon or rather driven by a few “black sheep” who 
heavily engage in such behavior while others behave altruistically no 
matter what the circumstances are. 
To predict who the black sheep are, we suggest measuring 
individual differences in people’s justice sensitivity (Schmitt, 
Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005; Schmitt, Neumann, & Montada, 
1995) – these are stable and consistent differences in the in the 
tendency to perceive injustices and in the intensity of reactions 
towards those injustices. Schmitt et al. (1995) suggest that justice 
sensitivity is indicated by four elements: the frequency of experienced 
injustices, the intensity of emotional reactions towards injustices, the 
mental intrusiveness of injustices, and behavioral reactions to 
injustices. Furthermore, depending on one’s role in an episode of 
injustice, different perspectives exist. These perspectives include 
perpetrator, beneficiary, and observer sensitivity (all being other-
directed justice concerns, i.e. prosocial justice sensitivity) on the one 
hand and victim sensitivity (i.e., a combination of self-directed and 
other-directed justice concerns) on the other hand. 
In prior research, justice sensitivity (“JS”) has proven valuable as 
it organizes prosocial and antisocial behavior in scenario studies                                                         
2 An article based on this chapter is currently under review. Coauthors are Thomas 
Schlösser, Daylian Cain, and Detlef Fetchenhauer. 
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(Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005) as well as 
experimental games (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004). Both types of 
studies provided evidence that prosocial JS is correlated to prosocial 
behavior while victim sensitivity is a mixture between genuine 
fairness concerns (justice for others) and the fear of being exploited 
(justice for the self); thus victim sensitivity is non-correlated with 
prosocial behavior. 
Examining whether subsets of the population (e.g., people high 
in prosocial JS) are immune to effects of situational variation allows 
us to jointly study the effects of personality and situational variation 
as well as their interaction. This was traditionally covered by 
psychology as the “two psychologies” (see: Lewin, 1936; Cronbach, 
1957), involving individual differences on the one hand and 
situational cues on the other hand, however nowadays research is 
augmented by the analysis of person-situation interactions (e.g. 
Bushman, 1995; Endler, 1997; Marusic & Eysenck, 2001; Schmitt, 
Eid, & Maes, 2003; Schmitt & Sabbagh, 2004, Skarlicki, Folger, & 
Tesluk, 1999). What the research shows is that usually both traits 
and situational cues somewhat influence behavior and, furthermore, 
their interactions are pivotal. 
4.1.1. The dictator game and situational variations as a measure 
of prosocial behavior 
The dictator game is a prototypical laboratory experiment 
showing the existence of prosocial behavior (Camerer, 2003; 
Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Guala & Mittone, in 
press). Person A is endowed with x dollars and his task is to 
determine a subset of those dollars, y (from zero to x), which is given 
to a person B in an anonymous, non-repetitive task which is 
supposed to completely eliminate strategic concerns and purely 
measures the degree of people’s prosocial behavior. A key feature of 
the game is that if player A sends $0, player B gets nothing but is 
told about the game and that an anonymous dictator sent $0.  
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Recent evidence incorporating social psychological ideas find 
that slight variations of the game provide inconsistent results of 
dictator behavior. For example, Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006) show 
that, while many dictators (persons A) give in dictator games, when 
surprised by the “Dictator Exit” option to renege on the gift, about 
half of the givers are willing to pay $1 to renege and leave the receiver 
with nothing, so long as the receiver is not told that a dictator game 
took place. This is what Dana et al. call “crossing the street to avoid 
the beggar.” The notion is that we may give to a would-be recipient, 
but if the situation allows us to avoid the recipient unseen, we will 
take pains to avoid giving. Broberg, Ellingsen & Johannesson (2007) 
elicit reservation prices for exiting dictator games and find that that 
roughly two-thirds of participants are willing to accept less than 100 
percent of the dictator endowment in order to opt out. Recent 
working papers have replicated this sorting out of altruistic situations 
(Lazear, Malmendier, & Weber, working paper; DellaVigna, List, & 
Malmendier, working paper); Cain and Dana (working paper) suggest 
that many givers would rather avoid the situations that trigger their 
own altruism and that a large portion of altruism is “reluctant.”  
Summarizing, researchers suggest that dictator giving thus does 
not only reflect preferences over financial outcomes but that “giving 
often reflects a desire not to violate other’s expectations” (Dana et al., 
2006, p. 193) as concluded from a willingness to pay to leave 
receivers in the dark what is actually going on. Specifically, less 
generous behavior is found as soon transparency between actions 
and outcome is reduced (Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007). Picking up 
after these findings, we explore three variations of the dictator game, 
examining how the interaction of personality traits and situational 
cues adds to our understanding of prosocial behavior. We argue that 
– in tendency – some people behave fair all the time while others use 
situational variations as excuses to pursue their material self-
interest. We thus address the stability as well as the fragility of 
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fairness regarding its dependence on personality, situation, as well as 
the interaction between them. 
4.1.2. Manipulation of Situation – Dictator Game Variations 
As a benchmark, we employed a dictator game with an endowment 
of 6€ (just under $10 at the time). As will be explained, there are two 
additional variations where it is sometimes easier to exploit the 
situation for selfishness’ sake (a lottery game) and sometimes harder 
(a reversed property rights game). 
The first variation reversed the property rights of the initial 
endowment (Bardsley, 2008; see also Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008) –
giving the endowment to the receiver and enabling the dictator to 
take some or all money away. The second (lottery) variation is 
designed to eliminate receiver’s expectations (Dana et al., 2006); 
leaving a dictator game without receiving anything is ostensibly less 
troubling if receivers do not know that they are a part of a dictator 
game but rather assume that their payoff is due to (poor luck in a) 
lottery. Dictators anticipate this fact and they can choose a payoff, 
which is financially more harmful to the receivers but does not violate 
their expectations. In the game we told dictators that their decision 
was highly private as receivers expected to be in a lottery with a 
payoff between 0-6€ and no information of the probability 
distribution of various payoffs. Just based on financial outcomes, the 
games are equivalent – thus a stable preference for others would 
suggest that people claim equal amounts of money in all three 
variations of the game. Also, the wording about the giving question 
was simple and held constant in all cases. 
4.1.3. Hypotheses 
We generally hypothesize that high degrees of justice sensitivity 
(Schmitt et al., 2005) predict willingness to endow money 
independent of behavioral confounds of regular dictator games, i.e., 
regardless of which variation of dictator game is presented. We thus 
expect people high in prosocial justice sensitivity to have stable 
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fairness concerns, and these people are reluctant to keep money to 
themselves while others pursue their material self-interest whenever 
possible. Thus, justice sensitivity provides an organizing pattern as it 
classifies people into those to who is important that the recipient gets 
$x is important regardless of situational variations. 
Specifically (hypothesis 1), we hypothesize the following pattern 
of behavior: First, we predict prosocial justice sensitivity (i.e., a 
composite scale of JSperpetrator, JSbeneficiary, and JSobserver) to correspond 
to higher degrees of prosocial behavior. The higher participant’s 
justice sensitivity, the higher their assignment of money is to person 
B, irrespective of the particular situation imposed by the variation of 
the dictator game. Second, the power of the various situations to give 
gets weaker with each variation. While in the taking-game pressure to 
give money to person B is strong, an anonymous dictator game is less 
strong, while the lottery game is least strong. Our manipulation of the 
situation is thus associated to prosocial behavior. As the game 
becomes stronger (lottery game via standard game to reverse property 
rights game), dictators increasingly leave more money to receivers 
(hypothesis 2). Finally, we predict interaction effects: While people 
high in prosocial justice sensitivity endow person B with equal 
amounts of money irrespective of the variation of the game, people 
low in prosocial justice slip through our situations and them to leave 
less money to the receivers (hypothesis 3). JSvictim, contrarily, is not 
expected to show any effects. 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants. 
 188 (94 dictators, 38 males) undergraduate students of the 
University of Cologne participated. They were aged between 19 and 
35 years (M=23.83, SD=2.82).  
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4.2.2. Assessment of Justice Sensitivity. 
Two weeks prior to measurements of behavior the justice 
sensitivity scales were used to measure JSperpetrator (α=.90), JSbeneficiary 
(α=.90), JSobserver (α=.88), and JSvictim (α=.85), with 10 items each (see 
appendix for items). We used a composite measure of the three 
prosocial facets forming JSprosocial (α=.89) and contrast that measure 
to JSvictim.  
4.2.3. Dependent Measures. 
All versions of the dictator game involved the opportunity to 
allocate an amount of 6€. Participants allocated that money by typing 
the preferred amount of money to Person B into a computer as well 
as physically fill and seal envelops that had “person B” written on 
them. 
4.2.4. Experimental manipulations and procedure. 
Dictators were randomly assigned to one of the three games. All 
dictators were guided into a one-person laboratory and worked 
through a computer-based questionnaire involving one version of the 
dictator game. Complete anonymity was guaranteed, as participants 
were not paid directly by the lab assistant; i.e., the experiment was 
double-blind. After participants finished working through the 
computer questionnaires and stuffed the envelopes, they stepped 
back into the room where the lab assistant was waiting. They were 
fared well taking their money home, which they decided not to give 
away. Study compensation thus was dependent on participant 
behavior. Later, receivers were recruited for a classroom experiment 
after a large lecture to receive the money. 
4.3. Results 
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations can be found in 
Table 1. We first show the isolated effects of justice sensitivity 
(hypothesis 1), then turn to the isolated effects of the experimental 
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manipulation (hypothesis 2). Finally, we address interactions 
(hypothesis 3). 
 
Table 1: Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations of all variables 
  M (SD) 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. € given away 2.29 (1.26) .37*** .31*** .22** -.05 
2. JSperpetrator 3.28 (0.92)  .61*** .74*** .00 
3. JSbeneficiary 2.39 (0.92)   .67*** .03 
4. JSobserver 2.72 (0.81)    .39*** 
5. JSvictim 3.00 (0.76)     
Note: N = 90; ***p<.001, **p<.05, *p<.10.  
4.3.1. Does justice sensitivity predict behavior? 
In order to determine the effect of justice sensitivity, we 
examined how prosocial facets of JS correspond to behavior. 
Bivariate correlations support our hypothesis that prosocial justice 
sensitivity significantly predicts the amount of money assigned to 
person B, rprosocial=.34, p<.01,.(all presented results of JSprosocial are 
structurally equivalent for the three sub-dimensions perpetrator, 
beneficiary, and observer, see Table 1). Contrarily, victim-sensitivity 
did not predict prosocial behavior, rvictim=-.05; p=.66. Thus, 
personality measured by justice sensitivity significantly predicts 
prosocial behavior in a way that people high in prosocial justice 
sensitivity endow receivers with more money compared to people low 
in prosocial justice sensitivity. 
 
4.3.2. Does prosocial behavior depend on situations? 
Next, we analyzed, how the different situation influenced 
people’s behavior in general. It turned out that the experimental 
condition significantly predicted behavior. As things become more 
confound, people in general exploit situations for the sake of their 
material self-interest. ANOVA shows in a model independent of 
justice sensitivity that the experimental situation significantly 
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influences behavior, F(2,91)=3.23, p<.05; η2=.07. Planned contrasts 
show a significant difference between the lottery game and the 
reversed property rights game, mean difference=.79, p<.05. While 
people demand more to themselves whenever it is receivers are in the 
dark about the game, they behave more fairly when the situation 
changes and they have to take money. 
4.3.3. How do the two interact? 
It was shown that both, personality and the situation, 
significantly predict prosocial behavior. Testing the last hypothesis, 
the interaction of the two was examined. We used multiple regression 
procedures to replicate the main effects (see respective b’s of 
regressions, Table 2) and show the interactions between categorical 
and continuous variables (Aiken & West, 1991) by applying an SPSS 
macro provided by Matthes and Hayes (2009). The experimental 
condition was effect coded (-1=reversed property rights game, 0= 
standard game; 1=lottery game), JSprosocial was centered, and then 
both predictors were crossed to form the interaction term (see Table 2 
for regression results). 
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Table 2: Hierarchical multiple regression for assessment of moderation 
 
  Victim   Prosocial  
Dependent: € given 
away 
b SE t b SE t 
JS -.02 .18 -.10 .48 .16 2.89* 
Version of Game -.67 .64 -1.04 -1.67 .58 -2.89* 
JS x Version of Game .09 .20 .44 .09 .20 2.52* 
Constant 2.34 .53 4.44* 1.07 .47 10.36* 
 
 
      
Unaggregated Scales:  Perpetrator   Beneficiary   Observer  
Dependent: € given 
away 
  b SE t   b SE t  b SE t 
JS .37 .49 2.61* .33 .15 2.30* .29 .15 1.88# 
Version of Game -1.07 .14 -1.81# -1.12 .45 -2.51* -1.56 .54 -2.91* 
JS x Version of Game .24 .59 1.40+ .36 .17 2.04* .43 .18 2.34* 
Constant 1.12 .17 2.29* 1.59 .37 4.28* 1.55 .43 3.58* 
Note: N = 90, *p<.001; #p<.05, +p<.1
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Regarding these, the following pattern was observed. In case of 
prosocial justice sensitivity, the interaction term was significant, 
b=.50, t(89)=2.52, p<.05. This effect is fundamentally equal when 
separating the three distinct perspectives JSperpetrator, JSbeneficiary, and 
JSobserver (see Table 2). On the other hand, the JSvictim interaction did 
not prove significant.  
Slope analysis revealed the following pattern (see Figure 1). 
While people high in JSprosocial assign a largely stable amount of 
money to person B, people low in JSprosocial exploit person B for the 
sake of their self-interest whenever possible/legitimate. Specifically, 
for JSprosocial the simple slope of people high (+1SD) showed no slope 
difference from zero, t<1, indicating a stability in the amount 
assigned to the receiver. Contrarily, the simple slope of the group low 
(-1SD) showed a significant non-zero slope showing how the money 
given away decreases if made possible. In case of JSvictim, neither 
people high in it (+1SD) nor people low in it (-1SD) differ. 
Irrespectively, the situations are exploited for selfishness’ sake.  
Thus, the pattern fits our hypothesized directions: People high in 
JSprosocial respond to presented situations by maintaining equal levels 
of giving rates. However, those individuals with low scores respond to 
it by pursuing their material self-interest. 
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Figure 1: Simple slope analyses 
 
 
Note: Dependent: € given to receiver, top panel: JS prosocial; bottom panel: JS victim 
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4.4. Discussion 
The current research addressed the stability and fragility of 
prosocial behavior often found in experimental games. Using people’s 
individual differences in justice sensitivity (Schmitt et al., 1995, 
2005) and versions of the dictator game it was shown, how person-
situation interactions in the context of prosocial behavior in 
experimental games can organize behavior. Specifically, it was shown 
that for people high in JSprosocial dictator behavior is stable across 
situations while others exploited situations for the sake of 
selfishness. Thus, population behavior is rather shaped by some 
people exploiting heavily (the black sheep) compared to everyone 
exploiting a little bit. In this sense, justice sensitivity serves as an 
internal “emergency break” to keep people from behaving in morally 
questionable ways. 
The results raise several questions: First, one might argue that 
the results (especially in the game where initial endowments were 
place on the receiver) are only a result of the endowment effect 
(Thaler, 1980). However, the fact that people high in justice 
sensitivity gave despite this proves that they overcame this default 
bias. 
Second, the use of justice sensitivity needs to be legitimated. As 
most measures of personality, a self-report scale using various items 
measures JS. Thus, all critiques for self-report measures equally 
apply to JS. However, comparing JS to other potential measures 
suggest JS to be very appropriate. Yet unpublished research (Lotz, 
Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2009) on donating shows that justice 
sensitivity adds to predictive power of donations when other 
constructs such as social value orientations (van Lange, 1999), social 
responsibility (Bierhoff, 2000), or moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 
2002) are included in the models. 
Third, the results have important implications to theorizing of 
prosocial behavior as well as to real world contexts. What is labeled 
here as prosocial behavior many economists often refer to as “social 
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preferences” (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; 
Engelmann & Strobel, 2004; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, Loewenstein, 
Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). When economists discuss social 
preferences, they often base their arguments on laboratory-
observations that people’s utility is not only derived by material 
payoffs to the self, but also by material payoffs to other people. Some 
of the discussed literature (Bardsley, 2008; Dana et al., 2006; Dana 
et al., 2007) seems to suggest how people’s preference are instable 
and fragile, triggering a debate similar to the debate in psychology 
about the importance of personality vs. situations. Our results 
suggest that some “fragile” individuals (those low in JS) largely drive 
these effects while others react quite stably to potential altruism 
situations, giving equal amounts of money away. Thus, the two lines 
of research are somehow compatible to each other – when accounting 
for justice sensitivity. 
Given that real-world immoral or illegal behavior is often a 
mixture between personality and situational opportunity, individual 
response to systematic variations in the situation seems a promising 
area of research. Future studies could include an analysis of broader 
ranges of behavior in different context, such as coordination 
dilemmas, the provision of public goods, and how to overcome typical 
obstacles of beneficial behavior in groups. 
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5. Justice sensitivity, moral emotions, and 
altruistic punishment3 
5.1. Introduction 
The functioning of human social life cannot be thought without 
social norms guiding the individuals' behavior (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992). However, many situations provide temptations to violate these 
norms at the expense of other people. But what happens if such 
transgressions are observed by independent third-parties? Imagine 
yourself in the following situation: You are to witness the interaction 
of two anonymous persons. One of them, the proposer, is given an 
endowment of € 10 and has the task to anonymously divide the 
money between himself/herself and another person, the receiver. The 
proposer, thus, dictates a fraction to the receiver and both persons 
leave with the respective amount of money. As an independent third 
person you are notified about the proposer’s decision that he/she has 
kept € 10 and has given € 0 to the receiver. Now, you face several 
intervention options: You can either do nothing at all; in this case the 
receiver leaves with € 0, the proposer leaves with € 10, and you get € 
5 remuneration. Alternatively, you can sacrifice some money you are 
about to receive and impede the proposed allocation. In this case, for 
every Euro you invest, the proposer’s money is reduced by two Euros. 
At ultimate punishment, all three, including you, leave completely 
empty-handed. How would you feel in such a situation as the 
independent third person? Would you sacrifice your money and, 
thus, intervene against an unfair allocation? 
This experimental situation has been designed to reflect the 
structure of social behavior outside the laboratory such as whistle 
blowing (e.g., Hopman & van Leeuwen, 2009), social courage, or other                                                         
3 An article based on this chapter is currently under review. Coauthors are Thomas 
Schlösser, Anna Baumert, Franz Gresser, and Detlef Fetchenhauer 
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costly forms of bystander intervention (Latané & Nida, 1982; Levine & 
Crowther, 2008) against witnessed norm violations. In a strictly 
egoistical sense, people should not, for example, speak up at work 
when observing injustices of any kind as whistle blowing might cost 
them their job. Likewise, social courage, for example by intervening in 
physical fights on the street (e.g., when an old lady is attacked by 
some teenagers) yields no personal benefits but implies a substantial 
risk for one’s health or even one’s life. 
In the presented experimental context, totally unaffected third 
parties should also have no selfish reason to use own resources to 
engage in altruistic punishment (Heckathorne, 1989). But 
nevertheless, research in different branches of social science has 
shown that people do. This phenomenon has been called altruistic 
punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003), 
strong reciprocity (e.g. Gintis, 2000), norm enforcement (e.g. Horne & 
Cutlip, 2002), or deontic justice (Cropanzano, Goldman & Folger, 
2003; Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress & Gee, 2002). 
The aim of the present study was to investigate systematic 
individual differences in the motivation to altruistically punish. 
Specifically, we addressed justice sensitivity (Schmitt, Baumert, 
Fetchenhauer, Gollwitzer, Rothmund & Schlösser, 2009; Schmitt, 
Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005) as a personality disposition as well 
as moral emotions as driving factors explaining these individual 
differences in behavior. Specifically, we expected that the impact of 
justice sensitivity on intervention behavior should be mediated by 
moral emotions elicited by an injustice.  
5.1.1. Justice Sensitivity and Altruistic Punishment 
A personality trait that should boost moral outrage as emotional 
reaction toward witnessed injustice is justice sensitivity. It measures 
stable and consistent individual differences in justice concerns. 
Schmitt, Neumann, and Montada (1995) suggest four indicators to 
measure individuals’ justice sensitivity (see also, Schmitt et al., 
  
37 
2009). These indicators are the frequency of experienced injustices, 
the intensity of emotional reactions to injustices, for example anger 
(Mikula et al., 1998, Törestad, 1990), the mental intrusiveness, and 
the punitivity towards the perpetrator (see e.g., Wenzel & Okimoto, 
2008). 
 As episodes of injustices can be experienced from various 
perspectives, justice sensitivity is differentiated accordingly into 
victim sensitivity (JSvictim), beneficiary sensitivity (JSbeneficiary), and 
observer sensitivity (JSobserver). These three facets of justice sensitivity 
share some common variance interpreted as reflecting general justice 
concerns (Gollwitzer et al., 2005). Moreover, JSbeneficiary and JSobserver 
involve genuinely other-oriented justice concerns and have been 
found to correlate with prosocial personality traits such as empathy, 
social responsibility, and role taking. JSvictim, by contrast, seems to be 
a combination of other-oriented as well as self-oriented concerns 
(Gollwitzer et al., 2005, Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Schmitt et al, 
2005). It was found to correlate positively with rather anti-social 
measures such as Machiavellianism, jealousy, and vengeance 
(Schmitt et al., 2005). 
Particularly important in the present context is that the three 
facets of justice sensitivity can be expected to have distinct behavioral 
consequences when injustice is witnessed. The research of 
Fetchenhauer and Huang (2004) reveals important points of altruistic 
punishment. However, beyond showing the effects of personality 
dispositions, the exact psychological processes driving these effects 
are not addressed. The goal of the present research was to replicate 
the findings of Fetchenhauer and Huang and to complement them in 
these important ways. 
 JSbeneficiary. In the situation described in the beginning, 
participants may find themselves as passive beneficiaries of the 
unjust situation as they were lucky not to be in the position of the 
receiver. Participants high in JSbeneficiary should be prone to 
spontaneously interpret the situation as a violation of their justice 
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concerns. Because they are particularly reluctant to have unfair 
advantages, in comparison to persons low in JSbeneficiary, we expect 
them to be motivated to invest their money to restore justice. 
JSobserver. Similarly, justice sensitivity from the observer 
perspective can be expected as a determinant of altruistic 
punishment. Taking the perspective of neutral observers, people high 
in JSobserver should be particularly prone to perceive the unequal 
distribution between proposer and receiver as unfair, and, thus, 
should be motivated to engage in re-establishment of justice even by 
sacrificing their endowment.  
JSvictim. By contrast, justice sensitivity from the victim’s 
perspective is mainly related to situations, in which people perceive 
themselves to be the victims of unfair events. Hence, people scoring 
high on JSvictim should be rather unaffected by unfair events that they 
are not personally involved in. JSvictim includes both self-related and 
other-related justice concerns that lead to conflicting behavioral 
tendencies that should level each other out. 
5.1.2. Indirect Effects: Justice Sensitivity on Altruistic 
Punishment Mediated by Moral Emotions  
In order to explain the psychological mechanisms behind 
altruistic punishment, it seems of high importance to understand 
how justice concerns motivate a costly restoration of justice. The 
emotions involved in justice perceptions and behavior have been the 
subject of much psychological research (Mikula, Scherer, & 
Athenstaedt, 1998; Montada, 1994; Montada & Schneider, 1989), 
with particular focus on emotional mediators between perceived 
injustice and subsequent behavior (e.g., Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 
2005; Murphy & Tyler, 2008). Principal among this research is the 
experience of “moral outrage” (see Feather, 2006; Mikula, 1986) – 
anger, contempt, and disgust emotions evoked by the intentional 
violation of cherished moral principles (see Batson, 1994; Darley, 
2002; Haidt, 2003; Mikula, et al.1998; Montada & Schneider, 1989). 
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Moral outrage has repeatedly been shown to elicit retributive 
responses such as retaliation, punishment, aggression, and revenge 
(e.g., Averill, 1982; Barclay et al., 2005; Feather, 2006). Indeed, moral 
outrage is the critical emotion mediating the effect of perceived 
injustice and injustice severity on punishment (see Carlsmith, Darley, 
& Robinson, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2002).  
Moral emotions have been recognized as a crucial element of the 
human moral apparatus and as an important link between moral 
standards and behavior (Blasi, 1999; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 
2007). Taking a functionalistic approach, Haidt (2003) defines moral 
emotions as those emotions “…that are linked to the interests or 
welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than 
the judge or agent” (Haidt, 2003, p. 853). Fehr and Gächter (2002) 
suggest that moral emotions are a key proximate mechanism 
determining altruistic punishment. Consistently, in a neuro-imaging 
study by de Quervain et al. (2004) altruistic punishment was 
associated with activation in brain regions connected to rewards 
letting the researchers argue that this result is due to the fact that it 
“feels good” to punish unfair others. Hence, punishment may work as 
a tool to regulate negative emotions. Accordingly, we expect that the 
confrontation with an unfair act triggers moral outrage and, thus, 
motivates individuals to retaliate. 
Importantly, it can be assumed that the degree that perceived 
unfairness triggers moral outrage depends on the perspective taken 
toward the unfairness. Specifically, research suggests that subjective 
self-involvement in an unjust episode is crucial for triggering “hot” 
emotions (Skitka, 2003). Accordingly, the perspective of a passive 
beneficiary of injustice and of a neutral observer can be 
distinguished: A person in the former perspective experiences him- or 
herself as genuinely involved in the unjust episode and can, thus, be 
expected to react with stronger emotions. By contrast, the latter 
perspective may involve rather “cold” cognitive processes.  
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Regarding the individual strength of justice concerns as reflected 
in dispositional justice sensitivity, particularly persons high in 
beneficiary sensitivity (compared to persons low in beneficiary 
sensitivity) should be prone to experience self-involvement in 
unfairness and should, thus, react with strong moral outrage, which 
in turn should motivate them to intervene and altruistically punish 
the norm violators. Thus, we expect moral emotions to be a mediator 
of the effect of beneficiary sensitivity on altruistic punishment. 
Observer sensitivity, by contrast, should feel lesser self-involvement 
and thus do not engage in punishment through the experience of 
“hot” emotions. 
5.1.3. Defaulted Punishment 
 As punitive intervention serves the restoration of a basic justice 
principle, altruistic punishment may thus have the connotation of 
being morally right. Nevertheless, other moral standards may prohibit 
the punishment of another person independent of his or her 
transgressions (e.g., the “do no harm” principle outlined by Baron, 
1996). Some people might claim that “two wrongs do not make it 
right” (Cropanzano et al., 2003; Turillo et al., 2002). Thus, we also 
expect a substantial share of participants not to engage in any 
punishment activity. Following this rationale, the present research 
also aimed to explore the reasoning underlying defaulted 
punishment. Punishment is only one of various means to restore 
justice subsequent to a transgression (Wenzel & Okimoto, 2008; 
Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008). Consequently, subjective 
reasons for non-punishing may be not purely selfish (as commonly 
assumed by economists who analyzed altruistic punishment as a 
second order social dilemma, i.e. the third-party is materially worse 
off punishing and thus does not do it, the agent anticipates this and 
thus does not split fairly; Fehr & Gächter, 2002), but may also reflect 
moral standards. We explored whether justice sensitivity also 
provides an organizing pattern in the reasoning underlying defaulted 
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punishment. While people relatively high in JSbeneficiary and JSobserver 
might argue based on moral reasons, people high in JSvictim might 
rather apply selfishly motivated reasoning. 
Summarizing, we expected some people to be willing to 
altruistically punish unfair norm violations whereas others should be 
reluctant to invest own money for altruistic punishment (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2003). Further, these individual differences in altruistic 
punishment should be explained by the personality dispositions 
JSbeneficiary and JSobserver, which reflect individual differences in 
genuine justice concerns (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004). By 
contrast, JSvictim should not have a direct effect on altruistic 
punishment. 
Complementing and extending prior research, we predicted that 
effects of JSbeneficiary and JSobserver should be driven by different 
processes: In general, we expected the individual strength of moral 
emotions to predict the willingness to altruistically punish (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002, de Quervain et al., 2004). Because “hot” moral 
emotions should only be triggered in situations of high self-
involvement, we predict that subtly measured moral emotions (see 
method section) should mediate the behavioral effects of JSbeneficiary. 
For JSobserver, we expect our measure of moral emotions to be 
relatively less important compared to rather “cold” cognitive 
processes as a mediator on altruistic punishment. Finally, it is 
explored how motivations to not punish associate with justice 
sensitivity. 
5.2. Method 
In order to test these hypotheses participants were exposed to 
the experimental situation described in the introduction involving the 
opportunity to engage in altruistic punishment.  
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5.2.1. Procedure 
On campus, participants were asked if they wanted to 
participate in several experiments. Once they agreed they were 
handed a questionnaire, which among other variables included the 
items of the justice sensitivity scales. A minimum of three weeks 
later, participants were invited in the laboratory and confronted with 
the opportunity to altruistically punish as described above. 
They were seated in front of a computer in our laboratory and 
given an envelope including five € 1 coins. They were told that this 
was an additional compensation for them and they were informed 
about the experimental setting presented above. They were told that 
they were randomly assigned to the roles of one character in the 
experiment. In fact, all participants had the role of the third-party. As 
above, they were told about an unfair division of € 10 made by an 
ostensible proposer. Participants had the option to invest any share 
of their coins to reduce the proposer’s payoff. An investment of 1 
Euro led to a reduction of 2 Euros in the payoff of the proposer. 
Participants were told that the procedure was completely anonymous, 
which means that interaction partners would not get to know each 
other. Expressions such as altruistic punishment, unfair proposal, 
game etc. were avoided. Instead we referred to their possibility to 
intervene. The participants worked themselves through a computer 
program, which was seemingly connected to the other persons 
participating in the experiment. They were alone in the room and 
believed the others to be in adjacent rooms 
After this detailed explanation all participants were confronted 
with the proposer keeping the entire amount of money for 
him/herself. To assess moral emotions in a subtle way, participants 
were then asked to give their statement about their thoughts and 
feelings. Only after they had typed in their statement and had 
pressed the enter-key they were informed on the next screen that 
they would now have the opportunity to intervene.  
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After participants had made their decisions, those who did not 
engage in punishment were asked for their underlying reasons. 
Specifically, they were asked why they decided in the way they did. 
Finally, participants were debriefed and dismissed. 
5.2.2. Participants  
Ninety-one undergraduates (33 males) from the University of 
Cologne participated in return for their varying compensation 
(dependent on behavior). Ages ranged between 19 and 42 years (M= 
23.0; SD =3.44).  
5.2.3. Justice Sensitivity 
In the experiment, the 10-item scales by Schmitt et al. (1995, 
2005, 2009) were used to measure JSbeneficiary (sample item: It bothers 
me when I get something that others would deserve; α=.82), JSobserver 
(corresponding sample item: It bothers me when someone gets 
something they don’t deserve; α=.79), and JSvictim (corresponding 
sample item: It bothers me when others get something that I would 
deserve; α=.81) on response scales from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). 
5.2.4. Moral Emotions 
Participants’ moral outrage was assessed by quantified 
qualitative measurement. After participants were confronted with the 
unequal proposal, but before being informed that they would have 
the opportunity to punish the proposer, they were asked about “what 
was going on in their heads” in an open format (letters in the 
statement: M=222, SD=191, min=10, max=1019; length was 
uncorrelated with variables of interest). 
We opted for this rather open measure of moral emotions for 
several reasons. Most importantly, it reduces the risk of an 
experimenter’s demand effect as well as socially desirable answering 
patterns. Letting people indicate how, for example, angry they feel by 
marking a number on a scale could lead to rumination about whether 
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or not they ought to feel angry in this situation. Leaving the comment 
field completely open, we did not demand anything specific 
whatsoever. Asking people how they felt in the situation led on the 
one hand to responses regarding moral outrage, but on the other 
hand to statements reflecting participants complete indifference to 
the proposer’s behavior. For example, statements were “Oh my god, I 
am furiously angry, I cannot believe that the proposer is selling his soul 
for the profit of € 5” indicating moral emotions, but also “I am so tired” 
as a statement indicating that morality, in this situation, was 
obviously not an issue.  
The exact procedure of extracting a quantifiable measure of 
moral emotions was as follows: The statements were pre-screened 
and categories reflecting moral outrage (these were anger and 
indignation) were identified. In the next step, three independent 
raters, who were all blind of participants’ behavior, judged the 
statements. The raters indicated on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) 
through 5 (very much) how angry (interrater reliability: α=.90) and 
indignated (interrater reliability: α=.91) they judged participants to 
be. For each participant, ratings were aggregated across raters and 
across both items (α=.96) as an indicator for the individual strength 
of moral emotions. 
5.3. Results 
Regarding the willingness to engage in altruistic punishment, 28 
out of 91 participants decided to punish the proposer with some 
amount of their own money. As this distribution was highly skewed, 
we dichotomized the punishment decision into those that did at least 
punish to a certain degree and those that did not punish at all.  
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5.3.1. Bivariate Correlations Between Moral Emotions, Justice 
Sensitivity, and Altruistic Punishment 
Table 3 provides means, standard deviations, and bivariate 
correlations among all variables in our study. In general, the bivariate 
results were as expected. First, a significant positive correlation 
between altruistic punishment and moral emotions showed that 
participants with higher moral outrage were the ones also showing a 
greater tendency to altruistically punish, r=.40, p<.01 (one-tailed, 
point-biserial correlation). 
 
Table 3: Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations of all variables 
Variable 1.   2.   3.   4.   5. 
          
1. Altruistic Punishment 
(dichotomous,  
point-biserial correlations) -  .40**  .28*  .26*  .08 
2. Moral Emotions   -  .22*  .10  .11 
3. JSbeneficiary     -  .53**  .27** 
4.JSobserver       -  .47** 
5. JSvictim         - 
M (SD) 
0.40 
(0.46)  
2.61 
(1.17)  
2.47 
(0.79)  
2.46 
(0.79)  
2.55  
(0.70) 
Note. N = 91; *p < .05; **p < .01  
 
Despite the substantial time lag between the assessment of 
justice sensitivity and the laboratory session, as expected, we found 
significant positive correlations between altruistic punishment and 
JSbeneficiary, r=.28, p<.05 (one tailed), as well as JSobserver, r=.26, p<.05 
(one-tailed). Contrarily, and also as expected, JSvictim and altruistic 
punishment were found not to correlate, r=.12, p=.40 (two-tailed). 
Furthermore, correlations among justice sensitivity and moral 
emotions were also consistent with our hypotheses. The higher 
participants scored on JSbeneficiary, the higher their score was on the 
scale moral emotions, r=.22, p<.05 (one-tailed). By contrast, 
participants score on JSobserver and their score on moral emotions was 
not significantly correlated, r=.10, p=.18 (one-tailed). Last, JSvictim did 
not correlate with moral emotions, either, r=.11, p=.33 (two-tailed). 
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5.3.2. Mediation Analyses. 
To test whether the effect of JSbeneficiary was mediated by moral 
emotions, we conducted analyses employing bootstrapping (Preacher 
& Hayes, 2004, 2008, in press). Bootstrapping allows for 
dichotomous dependent variables is advantageous in statistical 
issues (e.g. higher statistical power, no assumption about the 
normality of the indirect path, and relatively low Type 1 error rates).  
Analysis with 5000 re-samples revealed a significant indirect 
effect of JSbeneficiary on altruistic punishment (indirect effect: .18; bias-
corrected accelerated 95% confidence interval: 0.001 to 0.49; see 
Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Mediation results 
 
 
Note: N=91, *p<.05 **p<.01.  
More specifically, the effect of JSbeneficiary on altruistic punishment 
was mediated by moral emotions experienced in the moment of 
notification about the unfair offer even though justice sensitivity was 
measured several weeks in advance. 
For JSobserver as well as for JSvictim, there were no significant 
mediation effects on altruistic punishment through moral emotions 
as there were no significant bivariate correlations between the former 
variables and moral emotions. 
Thus, the individual strength of justice concerns, as reflected in 
beneficiary-sensitivity, appears to be an importantly linked to 
altruistic punishment. Among persons high in JSbeneficiary, the 
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violation of personally important justice concerns triggers “hot” moral 
emotions that drive attempts to restore justice even at the cost of 
egoistic motivations.  
5.3.3. Exploring Motivations Underlying Defaulted Punishment 
As outlined in the introduction, the non-engagement in altruistic 
punishment can, theoretically, have various origins. To account for 
potential motivations and justifications of individuals who did not 
punish, we asked these people to write down their reasons after they 
had made their decision. To analyze the content of the statements, we 
used the method of inductive category building (Mayring, 2003). From 
each subject's statement, all arguments were extracted in a first take. 
Subsequently, the subjects' statements were re-read, and, in case 
that a specific argument occurred at least twice across subjects' 
statements, it was considered a category. This procedure yielded in 
total ten categories (see Table 4). In the next step, four independent 
raters evaluated each subject's statement regarding how strongly it 
reflected each of the ten categories on a scale ranging from 1 (not at 
all) to 5 (completely). Thus, each subject received one score on each of 
the ten categories from each rater. Across categories, the inter-rater 
reliabilities were sufficiently high (all α>.70); Last, for each subject, 
we aggregated the four scores across raters to form a quantifiable 
measure of how strongly the person employed the specific category of 
argumentation. 
To further reduce redundancy among these ten categories, we 
submitted subjects' scores to a principal component factor analysis 
with varimax rotation. Scree test as well as Kaiser Criterion 
suggested a three-factor solution that explained 61.29% of the 
variance. Categories loading highest on the first factor were combined 
into a scale called guilty conscience. It reflects arguments pointing out 
that punishment would have been right, but nevertheless 
participants decided otherwise (sample statement: I wish I had used 
some money, I feel guilty for the poor person who goes home empty-
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handed). Categories loading highest on the second factor were 
aggregated into the scale efficiency. It indicates how much 
participants employed arguments with respect to financial outcomes 
for either themselves, Person B, or the combined group (sample 
statement: The group is better off if I don’t do anything. This way, we 
have made 15€). Finally, the category with highest loadings on the 
third factor was named compensation indicating that people were not 
willing to engage in altruistic punishment but would have preferred 
to compensate the victim (sample statement: I would have rather used 
my money to help [the receiver], not to harm the decider). Taken 
together, the resulting three factors suggested that the decision not to 
engage in altruistic punishment may indeed be based on other than 
selfish reasons.  
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Table 4: Results of factor analysis and correlations with justice sensitivity 
       Factor Loading Correlations   
    M SD 
Guilty 
Conscience Efficiency Compensation Jsvictim Jsbeneficiary Jsobserver 
1. Guilty Conscience (α=.80)      .00 .34*** .21* 
 No punishment...         
 …even though it would be fair in this situation 1.30 .63 .93 -.04 -.01 .06 .38*** .29** 
 … despite feelings of uncomfort 1.34 .60 .76 -.13 .01 .00 .19* .14 
 … after an evaluation of pro and cons  1.35 .62 .78 .02 .10 -.05 .28** .10 
2. Efficiency (α=.59)      .25** -.11 .08 
 No punishment...         
 …because it is inefficient and everybody is worse off 2.22 1.49 -.05 .84 .08 .25** -.21* .05 
 … because it would not yield benefits to Person B 3.10 1.91 .23 .60 .54 .12 .28** .12 
 … because it does harm to the self 3.01 1.67 -.17 .69 -.44 .22* -.37*** .02 
3. Compensation (α=.29)a      -.14 .24** -.04 
 No punishment...         
 
… because would rather transfer the money to Person 
B 1.88 1.47 .21 -.12 .68 -.14 .24** -.03 
 … because doesn't want to harm anybody 2.55 1.38 -.33 .03 .68 .12 -.01 -.04 
Arguments not covered by factor analysis         
 
… because Persons A and B are too abstract 
anonymous 1.78 1.42 .08 -.57 -.08 -.17* -.06 -.06 
 … because is not interested in the other people 1.27 .61 -.60 -.38 -.59 -.11 -.19* -.09 
Note: * p < .10; ** p <.05; *** p < .01; asingle strongest item entered analysis a part of factor "compensation" due to 
little internal reliability.
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Is the endorsement of the revealed arguments connected to individual 
differences in justice sensitivity? As bivariate correlations showed, 
among those people who had not punished, people high in JSbeneficiary 
argued based on moral reasons compared to people low in JSbeneficiary. 
The higher participants scored on JSbeneficiary, the higher they scored 
on the scale guilty conscience, r=.39, p<.01 (one-tailed). Additionally, 
JSbeneficiary was significantly correlated with a preference for 
compensation, r=.24, p<.05 (one-tailed), but was not related to 
concerns of efficiency, r =-.11, p=.21 (one-tailed). 
People high in JSobserver also showed the tendency to argue based 
on morality: Scores on JSobserver marginally correlated with the scale 
guilty conscience, r=.21, p=.053 (one-tailed). Values on JSobserver were, 
by contrast, not correlated to the will to compensate, r =-.03, p=.40 
(one-tailed) or the scale efficiency, r=.08, p=.26 (one-tailed). 
Results were quite different for JSvictim: This dimension of justice 
sensitivity did neither correlate with a guilty conscience, r=-.01, p=.47 
(one-tailed), nor with compensation, r=-.12, p=.17 (one-tailed). 
However, a significant correlation between JSvictim and the scale 
efficiency was found, r=.25, p<.05 (one-tailed). 
Summarizing, justice sensitivity was not only consistently 
connected to punishment behavior but also to reasoning and 
motivation underlying defaulted punishment. The different 
dimensions showed quite different patterns. While JSbeneficiary is rather 
connected to other-related justice concerns and thus expressed moral 
concerns, JSvictim always involves self-concerns. JSobserver was located 
between the two. Thus, the latter dominantly expressed concerns 
related to themselves and why an engagement in altruistic 
punishment would have not been efficient. 
5.4. Discussion 
The main goal of the present research was to provide evidence 
that individual justice concerns as reflected by the personality trait 
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justice sensitivity motivate the sacrifice of own resources to punish 
violators of basic justice principles. Moreover, complementing and 
extending prior research, we investigated moral emotions as a 
potential mediator of the effects of justice sensitivity. 
Consistent with prior findings, our study revealed substantial 
inter-individual variance in the willingness to altruistically punish. 
While some people sacrifice money for the sake of justice, other 
people stop short of supporting moral norms if their self-interest is at 
stake. The personality disposition justice sensitivity helps to explain 
the puzzle of these differences in altruistic punishment. Whereas the 
beneficiary and observer dimensions of justice sensitivity were found 
to be associated with higher willingness to altruistically punish, the 
victim-dimension was not. The evidence provided here was, in this 
respect, a replication of previous evidence found by Fetchenhauer 
and Huang (2004). Whereas the beneficiary and observer sensitivity 
is related to rather prosocial behavior, the victim sensitivity is not 
connected to behavior, because it involves diverging motives for the 
self and others, two aspects, which may cancel each other out in this 
type of decision task. 
Further, investigating individual differences in the willingness to 
altruistically punish here also meant to explore the reasoning and 
motivation underlying the decision not to engage in such 
punishment. Specifically, it was explored, whether or not justice 
sensitivity only helps to explain altruistic punishment or also helps to 
structure reasons and motivations for defaulted punishment. 
Especially in economics, the non-punishing of unfair propositions 
has been interpreted as clearly selfish or as a second order dilemma 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2002). As our results stress, from a psychological 
perspective, this view appears rather limited. A detailed look at non-
punishers revealed that motivations are not only self-oriented. In the 
case of non-punishing, justice sensitivity as a personality disposition 
helps to disentangle the various motives for defaulted punishment. 
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In line with theoretical predictions, people high in JSvictim who 
did not punish mainly argued based on their personal self-interest. 
By contrast, people high in JSbeneficiary argued that they would rather 
compensate the victim and that they had moral hesitations to punish 
and at the same time felt guilty not to have intervened. This view 
possibly originates from different moral principles of justice – as 
outlined above – such as the claim that another harm does not re-
store the original harm (e.g., Cropanzano et al., 2003; Turillo et al., 
2002). 
To complement the present research, future studies should, 
therefore, investigate whether some individuals rather engage in 
active compensation of the victims of unfair proposals instead of 
punishment towards the proposer knowing that both are effective in 
restoring justice (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008). This could include 
behavioral options of compensatory acts as well as other means of 
justice-restoration such as apologies by the offender or restorative 
conferencing. 
The highly robust finding of altruistic punishment has moved 
social scientists to consider other genuine human motivations 
besides selfishness. Particularly, moral emotions have been proposed 
as determinant of altruistic punishment in game-theoretic paradigms 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2002). As to our knowledge, our study is the first to 
provide systematic support for this assumption. Importantly, we 
found that people displaying stronger moral outrage as a reaction to 
an unfair distribution of money subsequently were more prone to 
engage in altruistic punishment. This result was found with an open 
measurement of emotions. Physiological measures might also be an 
adequate instrument. Both kinds of measures share the advantage of 
content analyses of open responses employed in the present study, 
namely, the exclusion of demand effects. 
In previous research, personality differences in emotions 
(DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Diener & Lucas, 1999; Ng & Diener, 2009) 
have been consistently documented. Additionally, the role of 
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personality regarding justice-related behavior has been the subject of 
various previous studies (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004, Gollwitzer et 
al., 2005). Moral emotions have been suggested as a mechanism 
underlying altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002, De 
Quervain et al., 2004). Hence, the integration of research on 
personality and on moral emotions as joint influence of behavior in 
experimental games is the merging of various research strains. 
The most important novelty of this research is thus the analysis 
of the two explanatory variables of altruistic punishment, justice 
sensitivity and moral emotions and their influence via mediation on 
altruistic punishment. Our key result is that moral emotions were 
found to be a mediator in the relationship between justice sensitivity 
and altruistic punishment. Whereas people high in JSbeneficiary 
experienced higher moral emotions and subsequently engaged in 
punishment, people high in JSvictim did not experience higher moral 
emotions and, thus, did not engage in altruistic punishment. JSoberver 
was only connected to engagement in altruistic punishment but not 
to the experience of moral outrage. This is an indicator that JSobserver 
is, indeed, rather connected to “cold” contempt than to “hot” moral 
outrage as in JSbeneficiary.  
As an overall summary, our studies provide evidence that justice 
does not, be it at least for beneficiary-sensitive individuals, stop at 
one’s doorstep, but that these people feel emotionally aroused and 
morally obliged to sacrifice fairly large sums of resources in order to 
reestablish what they subjectively regard as fair. This result even 
holds when interacting with complete strangers. Justice, no matter 
towards whom, is an important concern for people highly sensitive 
towards injustices. It seems they implicitly followed an argumentation 
once made by Martin Luther King jr. “Injustice anywhere is a threat 
to justice everywhere” and then acted accordingly. 
 54  
 
6. Emotional Antecedents of Third-Party 
Interventions4 
6.1. Introduction 
Uninvolved third-parties often witness injustices, engaging in a 
decision whether or not to intervene. Perhaps reflective of our 
reliance on sanctions in the legal system, the third-party intervention 
literature has been overwhelmingly dominated by the study of 
punishment of the perpetrator. This research has shown that people 
are largely willing to stand up for justice despite the lack of direct or 
measurable gains for the third-parties, a phenomenon often referred 
to as altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fetchenhauer & 
Huang, 2004). Social neuroscience has suggested that such third-
party interventions are functionally different to victim revenge 
(Buckholtz et al., 2008), leading to activation of brain regions 
connected to rewards and counterbalancing the negative feelings 
associated with the offense (de Quervain et al., 2004).  
Importantly, however, alternative interventions, including 
compensation, have been largely under-researched (c.f. Leliveld, van 
Dijk, & van Beest, 2008). This is surprising given that compensation 
may be just as frequent, particularly in social (i.e., non-legal) 
situations where the costs of punishment are risky and burdensome. 
It is therefore necessary to more fully explore other, arguably more 
constructive approaches to justice-restoration to determine whether 
they are driven by similar underlying motives, and thus whether a 
third-party observer’s willingness to punish equates with their 
willingness to compensate. 
In the current research, we examine third-party observers’ 
justice sensitivity (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005) as it                                                         
4 An article based on this chapter in currently under review. Coauthors are Tyler 
Okimoto, Thomas Schlösser, and Detlef Fetchenhauer. 
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predicts willingness to compensate victims of injustice and/or punish 
the perpetrator. To examine these behavioral responses, we employed 
a modified punishment game (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004) that 
allows participants to incur a cost for the ability to assign either (or 
both) injustice response. We suggest that both punishment and 
compensation are viable options for the restoration of an observer’s 
justice concerns. Further, we suggest that each response follows from 
different ethical motives and has distinct emotional antecedents.  
6.1.1. The Consequential versus Deontological Motives  
At its core, a third-party’s act of compensation is an attempt to 
address the negative consequences of an offense, while the act of 
punishment is an attempt to address the immoral intent of the 
offender through the administration of just deserts (Carlsmith, 
Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008). In 
philosophical terms, this is a distinction between deontological 
versus consequential ethical motives. Although there is clearly 
overlap (e.g., consequential motives also underlie punishment), 
compensation is a relatively more consequential response than 
punishment, which is relatively more deontological. Thus, the 
primary assertion in the literature that demands for justice are 
largely driven by deontological demands for just deserts (e.g., 
Carlsmith et al., 2002; Falk et al., 2008) may be a result of its 
disproportional focus on punishment.  
Notably, if compensation is indeed driven by more consequential 
(i.e., utilitarian) motives than punishment, it is not the injustice itself 
that demands compensation but rather the victim’s suffering that 
results from the injustice. Therefore, in situations where the victim 
does not suffer the effects of the transgression or is unaware of the 
intentional harm, compensation may not be necessary for justice 
restoration. In contrast, demands for punishment should persist 
irrespective of the victim’s experience of victimization, as relatively 
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stronger deontological concerns follow from the unjust act regardless 
of the associated consequences. 
6.1.2. Distinct Emotional Antecedents to the Reestablishment of 
Justice 
Reflecting distinct ethical motives, compensation and 
punishment may also address discrete moral-emotional concerns. 
Research on justice-based emotions (see Mikula, Scherer, & 
Athenstaedt, 1998; Montada & Schneider, 1989) has focused on 
emotional mediators between perceived injustice and subsequent 
behavior (e.g., Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005, Chebat & 
Slusarczyk, 2005; Murphy & Tyler, 2008). Principal is the experience 
of “moral outrage” (Feather, 2006; Mikula, 1986) – anger, contempt, 
and disgust emotions evoked by the intentional violation of cherished 
moral principles (Darley, 2002; Haidt, 2003) – which precedes 
retributive responses such as retaliation, punishment, and 
aggression (e.g., Averill, 1982; Barclay et al., 2005; Feather, 2006; 
Skitka, 2002). Indeed, moral outrage is the critical emotion mediating 
the effect of perceived injustice severity on punishment (Carlsmith & 
Darley, 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). 
In contrast, relatively little research has explored the link 
between emotions and compensatory justice. Some recent research 
has documented a link between moral outrage and redistribution of 
resources in response to societal-level inequities (Montada & 
Schneider, 1989; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007) and mandates 
of offender-conferred compensation (Darley & Pittman, 2003). 
However, there remains a dearth of empirical work exploring the 
emotional correlates of compensatory justice in interpersonal 
transgressions. 
Interestingly, despite the logical conclusion that moral outrage is 
not the only emotional response to injustice, there also remains 
limited evidence documenting the existence (or absence) of other 
types of emotional reactions. This may in part be due to the strong 
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focus on punishment in the literature given that it is primarily non-
punitive domains where emotional correlates other than moral 
outrage have been documented. For example, guilt predicts 
redistribution following social inequities (Montada & Schneider, 
1989), empathy predicts forgiveness (McCullough et al., 1997, 1998), 
and sadness/disappointment predicts consensus seeking (Okimoto, 
Wenzel, & Feather, 2009). Given the lack of existing empirical 
specification regarding the emotional antecedents of compensation, 
we will examine a variety of emotions and rely on emergent factors to 
elucidate the primary dimensions of import. However, based on the 
general themes identified in the literature, we offer a general 
prediction: outward-focused emotions (i.e., moral outrage) will be 
related to punishment while inward-focused emotions (e.g., anxiety 
and fear) will be uniquely related to compensation. 
6.1.3. Justice Sensitivity 
Clearly, desires to intervene vary across individuals. To capture 
this individual-level variance, we examined participants “justice 
sensitivity” (JS; Schmitt et al., 2005). JS measures stable individual 
differences that predict the frequency of injustice perceptions, 
intensity of emotional reactions, mental intrusiveness, and behavioral 
reactions toward injustices as indicators of justice sensitivity, while 
also capturing victim, perpetrator, beneficiary, and observer 
dimensions. JS has proven valuable in predicting pro- and antisocial 
behavior in scenario studies (Gollwitzer et al., 2005) and 
experimental games (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004). In the current 
context, people high in JSobserver (see Schmitt et al., 2005) should 
respond with stronger emotions (inward and outward) than those low 
in JSobserver and, consequently, should be more likely to punish the 
perpetrator and/or compensate the victim. 
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6.2. Method 
Participants included 178 students (66 % female) between 19 
and 33 years of age (M=22.83, SD= 2.46). They first completed a 
measure of JSobserver (see Schmitt et al., 2005; α=.85). Then, in a 
follow-up session two weeks later, they participated in the 
experimental game. 
We tested our primary hypotheses using an experimental game 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2002), a research tradition that has focused on 
offender punishment and ignored the realistic options offered by 
compensatory alternatives. Upon arriving, participants were told that 
they had been randomly assigned to the role of “Person C” in a study 
involving three people. They were told that Person A was given 10€ to 
allocate to him/herself and an anonymous Person B, and that Person 
A had split the endowment unfairly at 10:0.  
In order to vary Person B’s experienced consequences of the 
unfair allocation, we included a manipulation where the victim 
believed that his share of money was due either to the unfair 
intentions of a perpetrator (victim visibility) or to mere chance (victim 
non-visibility). Specifically, in the victim visibility condition, 
participants were told that Person B was fully aware of the entire 
details of the study. In contrast, in the victim non-visibility condition, 
participants were told that Persons B thought a lottery determined 
his share of the money; in this case, they were both unaware of 
Person A’s unfair allocation, as well as participants’ interventions. 
We then assessed participants’ emotional reactions immediately 
after they were confronted with the injustice. We assessed 20 items 
from the PANAS (Watson & Clark, 1988) and submitted these items 
to a principal component factor analysis (Varimax rotation). Four 
factors were extracted (eigenvalues > 1), with two factors capturing 
negative affect and two factors capturing positive affect. Given the 
injustice domain, the two positive factors did not provide useful 
information and were dropped from the analysis. However, the two 
negative factors matched the distinction between outward and inward 
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focused emotions. Outward-focused emotions (α=.85) included items 
typically classified as moral outrage: angry, shocked, hostile, 
distressed, and aggravated. Inward-focused emotions (α=.63) 
included: fearful, nervous, confused, and guilty. Items within these 
two groups were averaged to create composite scales. 
Participants were then given their own endowment of 5€. It was 
explained to them that, if they wanted, they could re-allocate their 
initial endowment to punish the offender, compensate the victim, 
some combination of the two, or to keep it for themselves. In other 
words, they were allowed to reallocate their initial budget in any way 
that they pleased. Reallocation was made in 50 Cent increments, and 
each 50 Cent reallocation resulted in a 1€ consequence. Any money 
not reallocated to punishment or compensation was participant 
payment.  
6.3. Results 
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations are presented in 
Table 5. We used multiple regression procedures to test interactions 
between categorical and continuous variables (Aiken & West, 1991). 
JSobserver was centered and crossed with victim visibility (-1=aware, 
1=unaware) to form the interaction term. 
 
Table 5: Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations of all variables 
  
Victim 
Visibility 
Victim 
Non-Visibility  
  M (SD) M (SD) 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Punishment 0.89 (1.27) 0.95 (1.40) .10 .41*** .13*** .23*** 
2. Compensation 1.28 (1.10) 1.08 (0.99) - .38*** .36*** .26*** 
3. Outward Emo. 1.46 (0.58) 1.46 (0.57) - - .51*** .26*** 
4. Inward Emo. 2.35 (0.97) 2.23 (0.87) - - - .21** 
5. JSobserver 2.55 (0.81) 2.58 (0.80) - - - - 
Note: **p<.05, ***p<.001 
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Generally, participants used both compensation (M=1.27€; 
SD=1.10) and punishment (M=0.89€; SD=1.27) to re-establish justice. 
Main effects were identified for JSobserver on both punishment, β=.36, 
t(175)=1.99, p<.05, and compensation, β=.35, t(175)=2.49, p<.05, 
with higher JSobserver eliciting more intervention. Victim-visibility had 
no main effect on either behavior (see Table 6), but showed a 
moderating effect on JSobserver. For compensation, we identified a 
significant interaction, t(175)=-1.69, p<.05 (one-tailed). Slope analysis 
revealed that under victim-visibility, JSobserver had an effect on 
compensation, t(89)=2.49, p<.05. However, when the victim was blind 
to his victimization, JSobserver did not have a significant effect, t<1. In 
other words, participants high in JSobserver compensated more than 
participants low in JSobserver when the transgression was visible to the 
victim. In contrast to compensation, the interaction between JSobserver 
and visibility was not significant for punishment. Regardless of 
visibility, participants high in JSobserver assigned more money for 
punishment compared to participants low in JSobserver. 
 
Table 6: Regression results for all dependent variables 
  Compensation  Punishment 
  b SE t  b SE t 
JS .35 .14 2.49* .36 .18 1.99* 
Visibility .63 .52 1.22 .73 .67 1.10 
JS x Visibility -.32 .19 -1.69 -.27 .25 -1.06 
Constant .39 .37 1.04 -.03 .48 -.05 
 Inward Emotions  Outward Emotions 
  b SE t  b SE t 
JS .15 .08 1.99* .30 .12 2.50* 
Visibility -.23 .28 -.84 .04 .45 .08 
JS x Visibility .09 .10 .83 -.06 .17 -.37 
Constant 1.08 .20 5.40** 1.57 .32 4.86** 
Note. +p<.10*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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6.3.1. Testing Models of Mediation and Moderation 
 To further explore the processes underlying participants’ 
interventions, and to judge the equivalence of those processes for 
punitive and compensatory behaviors, we tested two possible 
mediating models (see Figure 3) for each outcome: (1) mediated 
moderation, where both emotional reactions and justice interventions 
are contingent on victim visibility (i.e. victim-visibilty moderates 
initial relationship of JS to both), versus (2) moderated mediation, 
where injustice consistently elicit emotional reactions, but the link 
between those emotions and subsequent justice interventions is 
contingent on victim visibility (for an overview, see Preacher, Rucker, 
& Hayes, 2007). 
 
Figure 3: Overview of moderated mediations 
 
 
Moderations and mediations 
To test the moderation model, we used macros provided by 
Preacher et al. (2007). As shown in Table 6, JSobserver had a significant 
main effect on both inward and outward-focused emotions. However, 
victim visibility did not moderate the impact of JSobserver on those 
emotional reactions. Participants high in JSobserver reported higher 
levels of both emotional reactions regardless of the victim’s knowledge 
of the injustice. Nonetheless, consistent with past research 
(Carlsmith & Darley, 2008), when including both emotions as 
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possible mediators, we found evidence suggesting an indirect effect of 
JSobserver, through outward-focused emotions, on both punishment 
(coefficient=.64, SE=.12; 95%CI=.01 to .23) and compensation 
(coefficient=.36, SE=.09; 95%CI=.03 to .20) interventions. In other 
words, outward-focused (i.e., moral outrage) emotional reactions 
mediated the link between justice sensitivity and subsequent third-
party interventions. In contrast, inward-focused emotions did not 
appear to mediate the link between JS and behavioral interventions. 
Notably, however, this does not necessarily negate the role of inward-
focused emotions. Because the analysis failed to fully explain the 
pattern of the interaction, it was necessary to test a full model of 
moderated mediation.  
Moderated mediation 
To test the moderated mediation model, we used a procedure 
recommended by Preacher et al. (2007; model 5). Results show that, 
although JSobserver predicted stronger emotional reactions regardless 
of the victim’s knowledge of the injustice, the translation of that 
emotional experience to compensatory behavior was qualified by an 
interaction with the victim’s knowledge of his/her victimization. 
Specifically, inward-focused emotions predicted compensation more 
strongly under victim visibility; however, when participants believed 
that the victim attributed his outcomes to a lottery draw, inward-
focused emotions were not related to compensatory behavior. All 
other paths remained unaffected by victim visibility. Table 7 provides 
all coefficients of the moderated mediation analysis. 
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Table 7: Moderated mediation 
 DV: Compensation DV: Punishment 
 b SE t b SE t 
JS .25 .22 1.84+ .33 .19 1.78+ 
Visibility 1.27 .57 2.20* .87 .76 1.15* 
JS x Visibility (1.) .24 .20 -1.22 -.25 .26 -.98 
Inward Emotion .61 .20 3.12* .19 .26 .75 
Inward Emotions x Visibility (2.) .59 .42 -2.12* -.12 .37 -.32 
Constant .27 .42 .64 .24 .56 -.42 
Note: N = 178 +p<.10*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
6.4. Discussion 
The current research contributes to the literature on third-party 
justice interventions in three specific ways. First, this research 
highlights the failure of the experimental games and altruistic 
punishment literature to examine other types of justice interventions, 
in this case compensation. Indeed, the current findings indicate that 
in this game context, participants actually prefer compensation to 
punishment. Although it remains an open question whether 
compensation is preferred in responses to real observations of 
injustice across a broad range of situations, such a general effect is 
not entirely unexpected given the non-monetary costs and risks 
associated with real-life punishment. 
Second, this research emphasizes the importance of considering 
alternative forms of justice interventions by providing evidence that 
punishment and compensation offer two conceptually different 
approaches to the reestablishment of justice. From the results, 
punishment appears to be a deonance-driven response associated 
with moral outrage, robust to variation in the victim’s experience of 
injustice and suffering. In contrast, compensation appears to be a 
consequence-driven response associated with inward-focused 
emotions that only translate into action when the victim appears to 
suffer from feelings of victimization following an injustice.  
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Finally, the specific pattern of results identified by the 
moderated mediation analysis suggests that victim visibility does not 
moderate the experience of justice-based emotions, but rather 
influences whether those emotions result in justice-restoring 
behavior. Justice-sensitive participants felt sadness and guilt 
regardless of the victim’s knowledge of the offense, but lack of victim 
knowledge reduced the likelihood that those emotions resulted in 
compensation. This might suggest that the justice-related 
“consequences” demanding compensation are tied to the victim’s 
suffering rather than the unfair allocation of resources and relative 
deprivation. Alternatively, it could also suggest that compensation is 
not really a “justice-based” response but rather a strategic behavior 
meant to gain the gratitude of its recipient rather than to restore 
inequity. Punishment, by comparison, does not require the victim’s 
acknowledgement or gratitude, suggesting that it serves as an 
offender-directed intervention meant to address only deontological 
concerns.  
In summary, this research suggests fundamental differences 
between punishment and compensation as third-party justice 
responses. While considering the differential processes specifically 
underlying their assignment is clearly worthy of further clarification, 
people largely rely on both punishment and compensation as options 
when responding to an injustice. As such, it is critical to consider 
them both in tandem when attempting to understand when and why 
third-parties are willing intervene even at the cost of their own 
outcomes.  
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7. The taste of fairness – How ethical labeling of 
consumer goods shapes people’s taste 
experience5 
7.1. Introduction 
When engaging in consumption decisions about foods and 
drinks, people are confronted with huge amounts of information such 
as price or brand. Increasingly, more detailed information about 
products include calorie load, fat-content, organic production, or 
ethical labeled production using Fair Trade, which signals a “fair” 
price paid to producers in third world countries rather than the 
“world-market price”. This information-overload has motivated 
psychological and marketing research to devote many studies to the 
question how consumers evaluate such informational cues with 
respect to preference ratings (e.g. Allison & Uhl, 1964; Gerstner, 
1985; Huber & McCann, 1982; Levin & Gaeth, 1988; Rao & Monroe, 
1989 Shiv, Carmon, & Ariely, 2005). 
This research addressed the existence of so-called labeling 
effects (e.g. Pohl, 2004), which is people’s tendency to base their 
product evaluation on such extrinsic product cues (i.e. price, looks, 
or tags) instead of intrinsic cues. The agreed notion in the literature 
is that the labeling effect has its foundation in the consumer’s 
tendency to hold congruent a-priori beliefs, pre-trial quality 
expectancies, as well matching judgment of products (Shiv et al., 
2006). Prominent evidence is delivered by the infamous Coke/Pepsi 
study showing that the exposure to the preferred brand strongly 
determines taste preference (Woolfolk, Castellan, & Brooks, 1983). 
Specifically, it was found that the container (coke vs. pepsi can) had a 
greater effect on consumer’s reported taste experience than the                                                         
5 An article based on this chapter is currently under review. Coauthors are Fabian 
Christandl and Detlef Fetchenhauer. 
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content of the cans. Further, it was shown that consumers are fooled 
by labels and led to believe low-priced products to be of lower quality 
(Gerstner, 1985; Huber & McCann, 1982; Rao & Monroe, 1989), beer 
to be better if it is labeled with their favorite brand (Allison & Uhl, 
1964), as well as to prefer 75% fat free meat over the same meat 
containing 25% fat (Levin & Gaeth, 1988).  
In the current context, we offer an additional explanation for the 
effect in case of ethical labeling. We propose that consumers apply a 
what-is-fair-is-good heuristic to judge products’ taste despite the fact 
that Fair Trade is a credence attribute meaning that it actually 
cannot directly be experienced through consumption (Poelman, 
Mojet, Lyon, & Sefa Dedeh, 2008) – a factor potentially unknown to 
consumers. However, as justice in general has been identified as a 
major motive in many studies involving emotional experience, 
attitude, or behavior we believe that Fair Trade imposes an influence 
on judgment. For example, people are willing to sacrifice money for 
justice (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), they react to unfairness by 
negative emotions such as moral outrage (Mikula, Scherer, & 
Aethenstaedt, 1998), and they develop negative attitudes towards 
transgressors. Further, concerns for fairness are the key driver 
regarding the judgment of socio-economic policy measures 
(Haferkamp, Fetchenhauer, Belschak, & Enste, 2009) and in the 
realms of marketing and pricing, fairness is a key influence on 
product perception as unfair prices decrease subjective product 
ratings (Martins & Monroe, 1994). Thus, in many domains of human 
action, justice serves an important driving force. Fair Trade also 
directly addresses people’s concern for justice. It is used in virtually 
all kinds of consumer products stemming from third-world countries 
such as clothing, toys or jewelry. The area of foods and drinks, 
however, provide the most fertile testing grounds for a study of the 
influence of ethical labeling in consumer preference. 
Research on the labeling effect has shown how people’s 
perception is sometimes malleable and subject to subtle or explicit 
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influences which could be argued irrelevant for an actual preference-
rating. This is, however, not limited to gustatory perception. In a 
broader context of visual perception Balcetis and Dunning (2006) 
showed how people tend to perceive ambiguous pictures in a favored 
way. In this case of motivated perception they argue for a top-down 
process at work, meaning that people sometimes perceive what they 
want to perceive and actually do so. In fact, much research has 
indicated the human sensory perception to be jointly shaped by top-
down processes and bottom-up where experience shapes perception 
(Lee, Frederick, & Ariely, 2006).  
In the current context, a top-down process means that 
motivation for justice shapes the evaluation of how the products 
tasted. We thus attempt to shed light on the question whether 
justice-related labeling also exposes an influence on consumer taste 
evaluation through a subtle motivation for fairness. Hence, we raise 
the key question if concerns for justice are sufficient for people to rate 
a product’s taste higher. 
Generally, we hypothesize that ethical labeling influences taste 
ratings positively. As soon as products are labeled as Fair Trade 
goods, participants should rate them higher due to a motivation to 
perceive fair better than conventional (i.e. what-is-fair-is-good), 
irrespective of a-priori attitudes about Fair Trade being better as well 
as pre-trial expectancies.  
7.2. Experimental approach 
In two experiments of the present study, respondents consumed 
either a piece of chocolate (experiment 1) or a cup of freshly brewed 
coffee (experiment 2). In both experiments, a 2 (content fair vs. 
conventional) x 2 (label fair vs. conventional) between-subjects-design 
was used to test our hypotheses. 
To ensure that the products tasted similar in a blind test, we ran 
a pretest with 80 people, which indicated that neither chocolate nor 
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coffee tasted differently (scale 0-100: chocolate: MFair=68.25; 
SD=22.55) vs. MConventional=63.25; SD=18.73; t<1 and coffee: 
MFair=66.70; SD=20.95 vs. MConventional=70.40; SD=14.98; t<1). 
In total, 461 participants (194 males, Mage=23, SDage=3) were 
invited to the laboratory to participate in a study regarding the 
tasting of products. 241 tasted chocolate and 220 tasted coffee. In 
order to gain a higher credibility of our manipulations, our lab 
assistants prepared both coffee and chocolate in a way that subjects 
could take a sample out of the original container. Chocolate was 
consumed in little squares, coffee was consumed in a cup and freshly 
brewed by the subject using a Philips Senseo Coffee maker. Coffee 
consumers could add milk and sugar to meet their customs. In case 
of chocolate we had to use two different brands because in the 
German market no brand exists, which offers both Fair Trade and 
conventional chocolate. In case of coffee, the brand Valentino was 
used which provides exactly equal containers regarding their look in 
case of Fair Trade and conventional. 
Before participants could actually get their hands on the 
products, they were asked to read instructions and to fill out a 
questionnaire. In the instructions, people ostensibly consuming Fair 
Trade learned what the label means by a brief explication about how 
Fair Trade works. In order to not attract attention to Fair Trade in 
particular all participants were asked various filler questions 
regarding consumption habits and attitudes to other things such as 
organic foods or consumption in general. Before actually preparing 
and tasting the products, participants were asked about their pre-
trial expectancies indicating it on a scale from 1 (very bad) until 5 
(very good). After some additional filler questions, the rating of the 
taste took place on a scale from 0 to 100. 
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7.3. Experimental results 
The principal interest of this research in how consumers are 
influenced by the ethical label Fair Trade. We used univariate ANOVA 
to analyze the effects of the ethical product (fair vs. conventional) and 
the ethical label (fair vs. non-labeled). 
Both experiments support the general hypothesis showing that 
the label significantly influences the taste evaluation of consumers’ 
(see Figure 4). In case of chocolate, ANOVA shows a main effect of the 
label, F(1, 237)=19.83, p<.001, η2=.08, d= .53 (medium effect). 
Contrarily to the pretest, an (although weaker) effect of the actual 
product was also identified, F(1, 237)=6.00, p<.05, η2=.03, d=.23 
(weak effect), but no effects for their interaction, F(1, 237)=1.91, 
p=.17. While chocolate without the label was rated at M=65.94 
(SD=21.21) the chocolate labeled as fair was rated at M=76.00 
(SD=16.64). 
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Figure 4: Effects of the label and the actual product on taste ratings (z-standardized) 
 
 
 
In case of coffee, the effects of the Fair Trade label are similar: 
Again, ANOVA shows a main effect of the label, F(1, 216)=15.32, 
p<.001, η2=.07, d=.53 (medium effect), but no effects for either the 
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actual product taste, F(1, 216)=1.41, p=.24, nor their interaction, F(1, 
216)=.03, p=.57. Conventionally labeled coffee was rated at M=63.43 
(SD=20.04) while coffee labeled as fair was rated M=73.35 (SD=16.98). 
Thus, subject responded to ethical labeling as incorporated by the 
Fair Trade-Label with significant better taste-ratings compared to 
conventionally products. 
To analyze the effect of pre-trial expectancies, we tested for 
mediation using the causal steps approach suggested by Baron and 
Kenny (1986). The results suggest that partial mediation occurred for 
coffee, but not for chocolate. Sobel tests supported the results for 
both products (Zchocolate=1.24, p=.24; Zcoffee=2.67, p<.01). Thus, there 
are mixed results indicating that at least some of the effects of the 
Fair Trade label are not due to quality expectancies.  
To analyze the robustness of the Fair Trade label, we analyzed 
the effect more deeply for those who indicated an a-priori attitude 
that Fair Trade and conventional goods are equivalent. Across our 
sample, 78% of subjects indicated that no difference exists between 
Fair Trade and conventionally traded chocolate and coffee. Thus, 
showing the effect just for those who neglect the difference 
corroborates the theoretical consideration of alternative explanations 
of the labeling effect. And indeed, univariate ANOVA shows the 
hypothesized results for people explicitly stating that the Fair Trade 
does not taste better. In case of chocolate, ANOVA shows a main 
effect of the label, F(1, 180)=14.30, p<.001, η2=.07 d=.63 (medium-
strong effect). Similarly to above, a weaker effect of taste was also 
identified, F(1, 180)=4.67, p<.05, η2=.03, d=.22 (weak effect), but no 
effects for their interaction, F(1, 180)=1.56, p=.21. While chocolate 
without the label was rated at M=76.77 (SD=14.81) the chocolate 
labeled as fair was rated at M=67.64 (SD=20.43). 
In case of coffee, the label imposed a similar effect on 
consumers: Again, ANOVA shows a main effect of the label, F(1, 
166)=5.49, p<.05, η2=.03, d=.34 (weak-medium effect) but no effects 
for either the actual product tasted, F(1, 166)=1.92, p=.19, nor their 
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interaction, F(1, 166)=.01, p=.97 Coffee not labeled as fair was rated 
at M=71.51 (SD=17.51) while coffee labeled as fair was rated M=65.12 
(SD=19.50). Thus, the above effects were replicated for those explicitly 
stating that Fair Trade does not differ. The Fair Trade label 
influenced ratings for both, chocolate and coffee, positively. 
7.4. Discussion 
The current research showed the existence of labeling effects of 
ethical labels in consumer goods. In two experiments involving the 
tasting of chocolate and coffee participants liked the product 
significantly better when they were presented as a Fair Trade 
product. Further, it was shown that pre-trial expectancies do not 
completely account for the effect. Thus, the effect demands an 
alternative explanation, for which we introduce the argument that 
consumers feel fair products to be good. This judgment is robust to 
the a-priori attitude that Fair Trade does not differ from conventional 
goods regarding quality. Even despite an original attitude that Fair 
Trade and conventional goods taste the same, the mere exposure to 
the label yields higher taste ratings.  
Our results raise several additional questions. First, what might 
be the exact psychological processes driving this effect? We have 
argued that a top-down process affecting a motivation for justice is 
underlying taste judgments. Our results indicate that the labeling 
effect of Fair Trade is not anticipated since it is robust to the a-priori 
attitude that Fair Trade products should not taste better. Thus, as 
much of human perception is rather influenced by non-conscious 
processes (e.g. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), perhaps also the justice 
motive non-consciously shapes taste ratings. It would be probably 
rather adverse for people to consciously like two identical products 
differently only through a dependence of the box the product comes 
in. However, the exact processes if and how the label (non-) 
consciously evokes the influences has to be left for further research. 
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Second, we address the incongruence of some research showing 
that ethical labels do not impose better taste ratings. Thus, potential 
differences in the experimental design have to be discussed. Critical 
to the current experiment was the between-subjects design. Our 
participants only received one product to taste. Other research using 
a within-subjects design (Grankvist, Lekedal, & Marmendal, 2007) 
was able to provide contrary evidence that consumer’s actually rate 
taste experience equally when evaluating Fair Trade and conventional 
goods jointly (people tasted fruit juice in these cases). But why is 
that? When tasting only one product (our case) it is impossible to 
compare the taste to a benchmark. While it is easy for many people to 
compare products when jointly evaluating them, it is rather difficult 
to rate the taste of one product on an abstract scale alone besides 
whether it actually tastes good or bad. The fact that – at least 
objectively – both products probably taste decent makes this only 
harder. People generally tend to know if they like something rather 
than being able to quantify a preference for similar tasting goods. Our 
employed design matches real-world conditions since most people 
typically purchase one good and determine at home whether they like 
it or not. 
Third, we address the question of the external validity of the 
results and their relevance in actual consumer decision-making. It is 
important to discuss how ethical labels might interact with other 
labels such as brand name or labels about organic production 
knowing that all are potentially influencing subjective experience. In 
case of an actual purchase decision, labels typically overwhelm 
consumers. Not even accounting for the variety in taste and quality, 
people are influenced by prices, country of origin, and brand name 
besides the information about the good being produced ethically. 
While some empirical evidence exists stating the relative importance 
of hard factors such as price (Olson, 1977) it has, to our knowledge, 
never been investigated how different “soft” cues (i.e. Fair Trade, 
organic etc.) perform compared to each other. Even though ethical 
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labels and the underlying justice motive are somewhat important for 
people’s decision-making we acknowledge that indicators such as 
brand or country of origin serve as a stronger influence. However, 
this assertion is a question of empirical testing. 
Summarizing the current research, both, people’s gustatory 
sensation (Deliza & McFie, 1996) as well as their motivation for 
justice (Lerner, 1977) are two rather complex topics. It was shown 
how people’s justice motive has the power to actually influences their 
reported gustatory sensation.  By limiting our findings to reported 
sensation we want to leave open, whether the justice motive literally 
influences human chemoreceptors on the tongue or if that effect is 
just biased rating. Our prime interest by this research is not to 
encourage marketers to let people taste Fair Trade products in the 
supermarket to demand higher prices due the better taste. We rather 
wanted to show and encourage more research to examine how not 
only concerns about the self motivates people to see what they want to 
see (Balcetis & Dunning. 2005), but also that concerns about others 
determine that we taste what we want to taste – for example the taste 
of fairness. 
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8. General Discussion 
8.1. Summary of Empirical Results 
The current research was designed to shed light on justice-
related perception and decision making in various domains. First 
justice related decision-making was discussed showing that 
individual differences in justice sensitivity are systematically 
associated to prosocial behavior in the social science lab. Justice 
sensitivity measures individual differences in how humans perceive 
situations and how strong their emotional and behavioral reaction to 
these situations is. 
In Chapter 4 peoples’ justice sensitivity was measured in order 
to predict their behavior in variations of the commonly known 
dictator game giving a better understanding of human prosocial 
behavior. In addition to the standard dictator game, people faced 
situations where it is harder to exploit another person for the sake of 
selfishness. In this case, the original endowment lay with this person 
and it was the decision-maker’s task to take money away, thus 
merely reversing the property rights of the endowment. This was 
sufficient for people to take less money away than they demanded for 
themselves in the other conditions. In the other extreme, the 
decision-maker was ensured high degrees of privacy by the 
experimenter’s assurance that receivers were led to believe that any 
received money stemmed from a lottery. This situational variation 
significantly influenced peoples’ behavior. They became more selfish 
when the situation allowed them to. 
However, people’s justice sensitivity moderated prosocial 
behavior across situations in a way that those particularly high in 
prosocial facets of justice sensitivity left an equal amount (i.e. the fair 
share) to receivers’ no matter what the circumstances were. Quite 
contrarily, people low in prosocial justice sensitivity highly exploited 
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the situations in order to pursue their material self-interest thus 
driving the main effect of the situational variation. 
Subsequently in Chapter 5, psychological processes underlying 
justice-responses were analyzed in a more profound way. Closely 
matching the dictator game paradigm, the so-called third-party 
punishment game was used to learn about emotions involved in the 
willingness to punish unfair others and thus to use own resources for 
the re-establishment of justice. Also examining people’s individual 
differences in justice sensitivity, it was found that people high in 
prosocial facets of justice sensitivity were significantly more willing to 
altruistically punish unfair actors who decided to claim the entire 
money of a dictator game to them. People’s moral emotions – anger, 
disgust, and indignation – evoked by the transgression were the 
driving force of this behavior. Importantly, only people high in 
beneficiary-sensitivity punished more, because of their experience of 
moral emotions. In case of the mere opportunity to altruistically 
punish unfair others while ignoring other, potentially more fruitful 
justice-responses, this mediating relationship of moral emotions was 
not found for the observer-dimension.  
In addition to the identification of moral emotions as driving 
forces of third-party punishment, the underlying reasons for non-
action were explored. Hence, people were asked to give reasons why 
they hesitated to punish unfair others at own expenses. It turned out 
that justice sensitivity also provided an organizing pattern for 
defaulted punishment. While people relatively high in prosocial 
justice sensitivity (the remaining people who did not already punish) 
argued that they hesitated to punish due to ethical reasons (such as 
punishment is per se bad or punishment is not as good as 
compensating the victim) people high in justice-sensitivity from the 
victim perspective argued based on selfishness or rationality (for 
example by using arguments such as it is not efficient, no one is 
helped by punishment. 
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Taking some of the reasons provided by participants in the 
previous study, Chapter 6 of the dissertation re-visited third-person 
interventions using a version of the punishment-game but also 
involving an opportunity to compensate the victim besides punishing 
the perpetrator. Further, the subjective severity of the perpetration 
was varied. While in one condition third-party observers were told 
that victims attributed the offense on bad lottery draw (as in the 
private dictator game above), in the other condition they attributed 
the offense on a person (like in the standard dictator game above). 
The basic result is that people in general also rely on compensatory 
justice in addition to punitive responses to the injustice. Further, 
emotional correlates of either justice-response are distinct and 
dependent on subjective severity of the perpetration. In case of 
punishment, outward-focused emotions such as moral outrage lead 
to punitive responses independent of the subjective severity of the 
offense. This is a result closely matching the results of the previous 
chapter. In case of compensation, moral outrage explains behavior in 
both conditions while inward-focused emotions such as anxiety and 
fear are only an emotional antecedent of compensation when the 
victim is ostensibly aware of the transgression. Further, justice 
sensitivity from an observer’s perspective significantly relates to 
emotional response as well as both types of behavior – a result, which 
at first sight differs qualitatively to some results of Chapter 5. 
In a final empirical Chapter 7, the insight that justice affects 
people (emotionally and their behavior) was applied to a consumer 
psychological setting. Using the widely known ethical label Fair Trade 
it was shown, how the general concern for justice shapes human 
perception and how it can be applied in a real-context. The mere 
exposure of the Fair Trade label led people to judge the taste of 
chocolate and coffee better compared to (identical) samples without 
the Fair Trade label. It was argued that the justice-concerns serve as 
a top-down process shaping reported perception in addition to actual 
perception through a bottom-up process. 
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8.2. Integrative Discussion 
Drawing from the experimental results, many of them are in 
line with theoretical considerations as well as sound compared to 
each other. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 consistently provide evidence how 
prosocial facets of the individual difference measure justice sensitivity 
are systematically connected to “positive” justice responses. By using 
the term “positive” justice responses I do not aim to lift the insights 
on a normative level. I rather claim that people high in these facets 
are reluctant to keep money to themselves when it is possible to do 
what naïvely can be called “just”. Doing justice can, depending on the 
specific paradigm, be giving up money in the dictator game as well as 
giving up money to punish or compensate perpetrators and victims of 
unfair behavior in such. Chapter 7, although excluding the individual 
difference measure fits in the previous chapters by means of their 
general psychological insights. The chapter delivered the key result 
that reported perception is somewhat dependent on an abstract 
connotation of justice. Thus, the dissertation as a whole delivers 
insights how justice influences not only human behavior and 
emotional experience alone, but that it already “works” on human 
perception thus affecting all tangents of humans with their 
surroundings. 
Besides the unifying aspects of this dissertation, a closer look 
at details of the findings raise the question of congruence. Especially 
one aspect needs further discussion. In Chapter 5, the results 
suggest that observer sensitivity did not relate to moral emotions and 
thus, moral emotions did not mediate between observer-sensitivity 
and altruistic punishment in the third-party punishment game. 
Contrarily, this result diverged in Chapter 6 where moral outrage 
significantly associated to observer-sensitivity as well as punitive and 
compensatory responses to the injustice. But why was that? First, it 
has to be stated that the measures of emotions were distinct. While 
in Chapter 5 a rather open measure was used (participants wrote a 
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statement not specifically asking for emotions but merely what was 
going on in their heads), Chapter 6 relied on the PANAS (Watson & 
Clark, 1988) and thus specifically asked about affect on a Likert-
Scale. Further, we learned from participants that some were hesitant 
to punish and would rather have compensated. Observer-sensitivity 
significantly predicted the arguments used for defaulted punishment. 
In Chapter 6 the intervention options included compensation so that 
a broader spectrum of intervention could be realized. Thus, the two 
studies are hard to compare and it has to be left to further research 
how robust the findings are. Theoretically, the results do not 
contradict each other as mediation effects never accounted for all 
variance. Thus, it seems plausible that more mediators function 
between justice sensitivity and behavior, especially when such 
behavior includes several distinct options. 
8.3. Focus of future research 
The present research investigated several topics how concerns 
for justice affect human perception, emotional experience, and 
subsequent behavior. While the research addressed important 
aspects of social justice research, it also raised questions, which 
should be addressed by future research. The central topic of this 
dissertation was the action of independent third parties who observed 
deliberate transgressions by a perpetrator. These issues were 
surrounded by boundary conditions and determinants why unfair 
behavior takes place in the first place (see Chapter 4 including 
variations of the dictator game) and how concerns for justice can be 
applied in a consumer setting (Chapter 7). All of the discussed topics 
demand further research to examine the insights more thoroughly. 
Regarding the direct actions of people in situations, which give 
opportunities to behave prosocially, social science delivers many 
insights. Yet there remains a dearth of empirical work aiming to 
answer significant questions. For example, it was found in Chapter 4 
how individual differences in justice sensitivity bring more stability 
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into prosocial behavior. However, the important question how the 
found effects are stable not only across situations but also through 
time can be addressed by future research. In the presented studies as 
well as in much research people always distribute endowments, 
which were given virtually seconds before the demanded action. 
Interestingly to know is in particular if people are willing to give away 
money received quite some time ago and to determine the role justice 
sensitivity takes in this scenario. This would enable us to understand 
long-term behavior of people – incorporated for example by 
philanthropy. 
Further, future research should investigate the exact 
conditions, under which humans thrive to engage in third-party 
interventions. It became clear that punishment is not always the 
preferred way of action when having to engage in third-party justice. 
Compensatory acts sometimes help to address – potentially different – 
ethical motives underlying intervention. But life is rarely as easy as in 
the laboratory. In real life, sometimes intentions and outcomes do not 
reflect each other. For example, an intended harm might, by accident, 
not induce a harmful consequence. Contrarily, a bad consequence 
might be the result of chance. In order to gain a better understanding 
of the underlying ethical motives of third parties’ engaging, future 
research should disentangle intentions and outcomes to see if 
punishment and compensation truly reflect diverging ethical motives. 
Also, the “strategic” component of compensation needs to be further 
reflected. It may occur that people also compensate if the victim 
knows about that and, therefore, can acknowledge the action.  
Further, future research needs to better explore boundary 
conditions of compensatory justice. For example, lifting compensatory 
acts to interactions between consumers and companies 
compensation might yield a new understanding of important issues. 
In recent research, Okimoto and Lotz (in progress) determine the role 
of compensation acts in the airline and hotel industry after 
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transgressions such as over-bookings or room-downgrades. 
Especially trust and the clarity of procedures might be important 
factors influencing the outcome-favorability of compensations to 
customers. Also, in the context of Fair Trade products, trust is an 
essential variable in the found relationship. As soon as consumers 
lack the belief that the increased cost of Fair Trade products is given 
to third world producers there is no chance that they are willing to 
purchase such goods at increased prices. 
Summarizing, the area of prosocial behavior in second party 
justice as well as in compensatory justice involving third-party justice 
should be increasingly addressed by justice-researchers in the future. 
Especially experimental games seem – due to their high controllability 
and possibilities to disentangle motives – as a fertile breeding ground 
for new insights in the topic. The few ideas delivered here provide a 
basis of many questions to be answered empirically. As time 
progresses these answers are reached by means of different and 
innovative methodologies and empirical approaches – a topic which 
deserves some attention. 
9. Outlook: Social Science in the next 
millennium – advances in methodology and 
integration of sciences 
It is important to understand the current work in a greater 
picture of the study of human perception and behavior in order to 
reflect its relative importance and contribution to science. Topics in 
this dissertation included aspects of justice-related behavior in 
experimental decision tasks or consumer-related judgment. Many 
times it was pointed out how psychology and economics interact in 
the search for understanding human behavior. Specifically, many 
studies conducted – by psychologists as well as economists – were 
cited as the foundation of this dissertation. It was often argued that 
the work is inter-disciplinary in its nature and even though 
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psychological in its nature, (behavioral) economics heavily influenced 
this research, especially through the application of its experimental 
games. 
However, the integration of sciences does not stop here. 
Increasingly, scientists from cognitive and brain sciences (Buckholtz 
et al., 2008; de Quervain et al, 2004), as well as genetics researchers 
and medical researchers (Kluger et al., 2002; Munafo et al., 2008, 
2008; Risch et al., 2009) are gaining interest in topics traditionally 
focused on by social scientists. This interest stems from the 
fundamental questions about what our common humanity separates 
us from other species. Thus, a special interest that is shared between 
psychologists, economists, and “natural scientists” is why and under 
what circumstances prosocial behavior can be observed in human 
behavior. Here, it shall be briefly discussed, how this integration 
works and where it may lead. It is focused on topics important to this 
dissertation – personality and emotions as determinants of decisions 
in justice-related (social) issues. 
9.1. Genetics and individual differences in social 
behavior 
Originating from twin and family studies several researchers 
have shown that justice-related action such as other-regarding 
behavior, cooperation and trust are partially hardwired meaning that 
humans possess specific genetic structures to engage in such 
behavior (Ebstein, Israel, Chew, Zhong, & Knafo; 2010). In the past 
two decades, the genetics of personality was a blooming field of 
research (Ebstein, 2006; Kluger et al., 2002; Munafo et al., 2008, 
2008; Risch et al., 2009). Only recently, genetics research has also 
been addressed in experimental games (Dreber, Apicella, & 
Eisenberg, 2009; Israel et al., 2009; Knafo et al., 2008; Kuhnen and 
Chiao, 2009; Zhong et al., 2009a, 2009b), sometimes even in 
combination with brain imaging (Buckholtz et al., 2008, Fehr & 
Camerer, 2007). 
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Neurogenetic research seems to suggest especially the 
neuropeptides oxytocin (OT) and arginine vasopressine (AVP) to 
associate to human social behavior. In experiments involving genetic 
or neural correlates of behavior in dictator games, ultimatum games, 
and the trust game, OT and AVP has been shown to partially explain 
variance (Ebstein et al., 2010). Also, social value orientations (van 
Lange, 1997) were associated to the two neuropeptides (Knafo et al., 
2008). These results suggest that justice sensitivity, which is related 
to behavior in games as well as social-value orientations might be 
associated similarly. Thus, the genetic underpinning of justice 
sensitivity and, subsequently, the relation to behavior in controlled 
experimental games seems a fruitful area of conduct. 
9.2. Physiological measures of emotions 
This research included several methods of emotions such as an 
open measure submitted to qualitative analysis (Chapter 5) or the 
traditional measure of PANAS (Watson & Clark, 1988; Chapter 6). 
However, scientists have introduced other measures as well – 
physiological measurement tools to subtly measure the emotions of 
study participants. When physiological measures are discussed in 
emotion-research, typically skin-conductance-level (SCL) is 
monitored. Also, in experimental games SCL-research was 
prominently used (Ben-Shakar, Bornstein, Hopfensitz, & van Winden, 
2007) to predict behavior in the power-to-take game, which is an 
augmentation of the standard ultimatum-game. By also using self-
report measures of emotion (see also Bosman & van Winden, 2002) 
closely matching the PANAS (Watson & Clark, 1988) it was observed 
that the two measures of emotions closely related to each other. 
Thus, qualitatively, it does not make a big difference whether 
emotions are measured “classically” by the means of self-report-
measures of “modern” by the means of fancy physiological measures. 
The main argument of researchers arguing for physiological measures 
include the cognitive aspect of self-report measures meaning that 
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people have to think about how they feel in order to report they 
emotion on a scale. Additionally, self-report measures elicit “demand-
effects” (i.e. should a participant feel this emotion in this situation). 
However, for example some authors (Schlösser, Dunning, & 
Fetchenhauer, 2010; Schlösser, Fetchenhauer, & Dunning; 2010) 
showed elegantly how these problems could be circumvented using 
Self-Assessment-Manikins (Fischer, Brauns, & Belschak, 2002). The 
downside of physiological measures, contrarily, are fairly obvious and 
include difficult study logistics, associated costs as well as the lack of 
distinction in specific emotions, which especially the findings of 
chapter 6 showed to be of immense importance in the understanding 
of prosocial behavior. 
9.3.  Natural sciences – the new social science? 
The previous considerations pointed to an increasing 
importance of “natural sciences” in traditional areas of social science. 
And truly, social scientist have gained a whole new interest in 
combining their methods with other “hard sciences” such as 
molecular biology, genetics, or neuroscience. But why is that? When 
talking about social science, economics and political science are more 
recently exploring these new methods of conduct while others, such 
as psychology have relied on them much longer – especially in non-
social contexts such as personality and clinical research. What seems 
to be puzzling now is that the study of human concerns for justice, 
cooperation and trust is now a shared interest between psychologists 
and behavioral economists on the one side and genetics, medical and 
neurological researcher on the other side. 
However, based on the review of articles the evidence from 
natural scientists helps to understand human behavior but this 
research has shown that “traditional” methods, which combine 
psychological and economic tool are still very applicable because they 
efficiently gain insights in human perception, motivation and 
behavior. Especially in the justice domain there is still much to learn. 
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9.4. Closing – stability vs. fragility of fairness 
This dissertation addressed several justice related situations 
delivering insights into how people make decisions and about what 
people feel and think before and after making such. Further, it was 
shown how justice sometimes subtly influences us – with as little 
necessary as a label on a product. 
Specifically, fairness in human action was shown to be 
profoundly stable in many domains. For example, people with 
particular high degrees of prosocial justice sensitivity seem to be 
immune to little tricks and manipulation imposed by the experiments 
shown here. They behave fair no matter what. Yet contrarily, people 
without high degrees of the trait fell prey to what we did showing how 
equally fragile fairness sometimes is. The findings were extended to 
situations reflecting social courage – be it by means of punishing 
offenders or compensating victims. Again, social courage was 
sometimes immune to twists such as the victim’s felt victimization 
while sometimes not. In total, this dissertation has answered some 
questions towards our understanding of justice. However, it has 
raised equally many thus opening grounds for much more research 
in the area. In science as in real life, especially the small things that 
influence us in our fair or unfair behavior are potentially of big 
importance – yet this is a thought, which has been around quite a 
while. 
 
 
In matters of truth and justice, there is no difference between large and 
small problems, for issues concerning the treatment of people are all the same. 
ALBERT EINSTEIN 
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11. Appendix 
People react quite differently in unfair situations. How about you? 
First, we will look at situations to the advantage of others and to your 
own disadvantage. 
 
1. It bothers me when others receive something that ought to be mine. 
2. It makes me angry when others receive a reward that I have earned. 
3. I cannot easily bear it when others profit unilaterally from me. 
4. It takes me a long time to forget when I have to fix others’ carelessness. 
5. It gets me down when I get fewer opportunities than others to develop my 
skills. 
6. It makes me angry when others are undeservingly better off than me. 
7. It worries me when I have to work hard for things that come easily to others. 
8. I ruminate for a long time when other people are treated better than me. 
9. It burdens me to be criticized for things that are overlooked with others. 
10. It makes me angry when I am treated worse than others. 
 
Now, we will look at situations in which you notice or learn that 
someone else is being treated unfairly, put at a disadvantage, or 
used. 
 
11. It bothers me when someone gets something they don’t deserve. 
12. I am upset when someone does not get a reward he/she has earned. 
13. I cannot easily bear it when someone unilaterally profits from others. 
14. It takes me a long time to forget when someone else has to fix others’ 
carelessness. 
15. It disturbs me when someone receives fewer opportunities to develop 
his/her skills than others. 
16. I am upset when someone is undeservingly worse off than others. 
17. It worries me when someone has to work hard for things that come easily to 
others. 
18. I ruminate for a long time when someone is treated nicer than others for no 
reason. 
19. It gets me down to see someone criticized for things that are overlooked with 
others. 
20. I am upset when someone is treated worse than others. 
 
Now, we will look at situations that turn out to your advantage and to 
the disadvantage of others. 
 
21. It disturbs me when I receive what others ought to have. 
22. I have a bad conscience when I receive a reward that someone else has 
earned. 
23. I cannot easily bear it to unilaterally profit from others. 
24. It takes me a long time to forget when others have to fix my carelessness. 
25. It disturbs me when I receive more opportunities than others to develop my 
skills. 
26. I feel guilty when I am better off than others for no reason. 
27. It bothers me when things come easily to me that others have to work hard 
for. 
28. I ruminate for a long time about being treated nicer than others for no 
reason. 
29. It bothers me when someone tolerates things with me that other people are 
being criticized for. 
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30. I feel guilty when I receive better treatment than others. 
 
Finally, we will look at situations in which you treat someone else 
unfairly, 
discriminate against someone, or exploit someone. 
Not at all Exactly 
 
31. It gets me down when I take something from someone else that I don’t 
deserve. 
32. I have a bad conscience when I deny someone the acknowledgment he or 
she deserves. 
33. I cannot stand the feeling of exploiting someone. 
34. It takes me a long time to forget when I allow myself to be careless at the 
expense of someone else. 
35. It disturbs me when I take away from someone else the possibility of 
developing his or her potential. 
36. I feel guilty when I enrich myself at the cost of others. 
37. It bothers me when I use tricks to achieve something while others have to 
struggle for it. 
38. I ruminate for a long time when I treat someone less friendly than others 
without a reason. 
39. I have a bad conscience when I criticize someone for things I tolerate in 
others. 
40. I feel guilty when I treat someone worse than others 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Note: Items 1 through 10 measure victim sensitivity, 11 through 20 measure 
observer sensitivity, 21 through 30 measure beneficiary sensitivity, and 31 through 
40 measure perpetrator sensitivity. Based on feedback from English native 
speakers, the wording of the victim, observer, and beneficiary sensitivity items was 
changed slightly compared to Schmitt et al. (2005).  
